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ONE COUNTRY, TWO SOCIETIES?
Germany twenty years after reunification
Introduction
3 October 2010 marked the twentieth anniversary of the reunification of the
two German states. This anniversary has provided an occasion for summing up
and evaluating the changes which have taken place in both parts of Germany
since 1990. Germany became reunited through the incorporation of the East
German federal states to the then Federal Republic of Germany. This is the rea-
son why the West German point of view is predominant in public discourse
regarding this issue, which is manifested through grading the new federal
states for their progress in assimilation to the western part of Germany. How -
ever, this way the positive changes which have taken place in the social, politi -
cal and economic areas in the eastern federal states over the past two decades
are often disregarded. If one looked at eastern Germany as a separate entity in -
stead of simply pointing out the differences between the new and the old fede -
ral states, they would see that the situation in the east is not as bad as could be
concluded from media reports and numerous publications. Nevertheless, it is clear
that it will take many years for the new federal states to reach the level of the
old ones. This study is an attempt to show the changes which have taken place
in Germany over the past twenty years, also taking into account those areas in
which new federal states have outperformed the western part of the country.
This text is intended to find an answer to the question of the extent of the pro -
cess of the unification of the two German states, in which areas it has been
crowned with success and in which areas it remains unfinished. For this pur-
pose we will employ an analysis of changes which have taken and which are
taking place in society, politics and the economy in both the eastern and west-
ern parts of Germany. This study has been developed on the basis of source
texts, German, British and Polish publications, interviews with experts and par-
ticipant observations by the authors.
This text discusses issues from the following thematic categories: (1) society,
taking into account the differences in mentality and the approach to history; 
(2) political system, including voting preferences and turnout; and (3) economy
5
in the old and the new federal states. Additionally, this study includes a brief
outline on the process of the reunification of Germany, which places the
changes being analysed in the historical context and at the same time provides
a starting point for an analysis of the transformation which has taken place
over the twenty years since the reunification of the two German states.
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Theses
1. Two German societies are still functioning in parallel twenty years after
the reunification of East and West Germany. The mutual negative stereotypes
which still exist ensure the division remains. One of the factors strengthening
the divide and which is simultaneously a consequence of the existence of two
German societies is the presence of two varying versions of history in the minds
of the residents of the new and old federal states. This is partly an effect of diffe -
rent ways of forming an identity in the two parts of the country, which in turn
results from the operation of two political systems (democratic and totali ta rian)
for almost half a century in what is now a united Germany. The simultaneous
existence of two societies is also partly caused by the strong disagreement over
the interpretation of German history after 1945.
2. The process of adjustment of the new federal states to the models and me -
chanisms functioning in the old federal states is commonly used in public
dis course in Germany and other countries as a criterion for the evaluation of
the degree of Germany’s unification. This is a mistake. Such an approach stems
from the perception of Germany as a conglomerate of two separate parts,
the East and West Germany. This also leads to a disregarding of the histori-
cally conditioned economic, cultural and identity differences between the va-
rious federal states.
News broadcasts regarding the degree of Germany’s unification and the new fe -
deral states themselves are created by media corporations based in the west of
the country, and are often one-sided. Most of the reports are focused on describing
negative phenomena observed in the new federal states. This especially concerns
insufficient economic development and self-sufficiency as compared to the guide-
lines adopted in 1990. Such broadcasts thus support the negative stereotypes
in German society. In turn, positive examples of changes in the east of Germany
(for example, the rapid development of the southern federal states, Saxony and
Thuringia) and the solutions which are functioning there better than in the old
federal states, such as nursery and kindergarten care and school education, are
as a rule not mentioned. The new federal states are perceived as an integral
entity, while historical differences between individual regions are unnoticed.
An approach like this causes distortions.
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3. The economic situation is not as bad in all eastern federal states as is re -
ported in most media broadcasts. The new federal states are developing at
a faster rate than those located in the western part of Germany albeit they
are still far from reaching the level of the old federal states. There is a very
strong divide between the rich south and the poorer north in both eastern
and western parts of Germany.
As is the case with the old federal states, eastern Germany’s key industrial cen-
tres are located in the south: in Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia. Inno va -
tive solar, chemical and energy industry centres have developed there since
reunification, boosting the economy elsewhere in eastern Germany. Their emer-
gence and development were possible owing to subsidies allocated for the de ve -
lopment of innovative branches of the economy in eastern Germany. At present
the southern federal states are developing at the fastest rate in eastern Ger ma ny.
In turn, the northern federal states, where agriculture is predominant and in -
dustry is poorly developed, such as Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Bran den -
burg in the east and Schleswig-Holstein and Bremen in the west, are the poor-
est federal states in Germany.
4. Different political sentiments have developed in eastern and western Ger -
many. The most evident differences are those in the level of public support
for the smaller parties. Despite the acceptance and satisfaction with democ-
racy as a political system, both left and right wing radical parties enjoy
much stronger support in the eastern federal states than in the west.
Most residents of the eastern federal states support democracy as a political
system but declare their dissatisfaction with the way it is being implemented.
More people are dissatisfied with the present state of democracy in the east of
the country than in the west. One sign of that is the much higher public support
for radical parties, both on the left (the Left Party) and on the right (the NPD and
the DVU) of the political scene in the new federal states. Economic, demogra phic
and social factors (for example, engagement in public activity is lower than in
the west) additionally contribute to increasing support for neo-Nazi groupings
in the poorest German federal states. In turn, the non-associated radical left (i.e.
‘autonomous communities’ operating outside the political mainstream) enjoy
higher support in the old federal states.
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5. The predominant view in the perception of Germany is that eastern com-
panies and residents of the new federal states are the main beneficiaries of
the reunification. It is true that the new federal states since 1990 have been
receiving funds from the EU as well as those allocated from the central budget
and the budgets of old federal states (it has been estimated that the total
amount of subsidies to boost the eastern German economy will reach appro -
ximately 3 trillion euros within the time span 1990–2019). However, it also
has to be noted that western German companies have also benefited from
the funds allocated for the economic modernisation and development of east -
ern Germany. Furthermore, the reunification of Germany brought about the
opening of a new attractive outlet for companies from the old federal states.
The economic development in the new federal states over the past two decades
has been dependent on funds transferred from both the federal budget and the
budgets of the old federal states, and – to a lesser extent – on EU subsidies. The
funds allocated for boosting the economy, creating new jobs and modernising
infrastructure have also yielded measurable benefits to western German compa-
nies, some of which have moved their offices to the new federal states and are
capitalising on the subsidies (for example, construction companies). These are
mostly subsidiaries of large corporations, the central offices of which are still
located in the west of the country. In effect, the new federal states have a small
share in German exports, and the profits generated by the subsidiaries usually
go back to the central offices of particular companies. The partial movement of
the western firms’ offices to the new federal states has been beneficial to both
residents in the east (new jobs have been created) and to entrepreneurs in the
west (receiving subsidies).
6. The enormous financial support for the new federal states has upset the
balance between the two parts of Germany as regards the tempo of modern i-
sing the existing infrastructure and building a new one. Owing to the transfers
of funds, the roads, railroads and telecommunication networks are in a much
better condition in the east than in the west of Germany. For example, al though
the western motorway network is still better-developed than that in the
east, it requires a thorough modernisation in many places.
After two decades of subsidising the economy of eastern federal states with
funds from the federal budget, the western German public and politicians have
become increasingly opposed to further financial support for the new federal
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states. This is because the infrastructure in the old federal states is in some
cases in a worse condition, and there have been widely publicised cases of the
subsidies being used by the new federal states for purposes other than those
they were allocated to. Politicians from the old federal states are increasingly
more often demanding that the funds allocated so far for the modernisation of
the east should be redirected to the west of Germany.
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THE ROAD TO THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY
Erich Honecker said in his speech on 7 October 1989 commemorating the for-
tieth anniversary of the German Democratic Republic: “We shall still strive for
the development of our republic in the community of socialist states through
the policy of continuation and revival. We shall not be satisfied with our achie -
vements, but we shall protect them. Having liberated ourselves from restraints,
we shall enter the path of common economic and social policy”. If such words
had been said a few months earlier, nobody would have been surprised; at the
beginning of 1989, East Germany seemed a stable state, widely recognised across
the world and having no organised opposition or schisms inside the party. The
carefully prepared celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the German De mo -
cratic Republic was supposed to prove that stability.
However, neither Honecker’s speech, nor press publications managed to con-
vince East German citizens that their country had more benefits than West Ger -
many. Since May 1989 East German residents had been fleeing on a mass scale
to the West via Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The celebration of the for-
tieth anniversary of the socialist German state, in which Mikhail Gorbachev
participated, simply revealed once more the helplessness of the leadership of
the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED). While the official celebrations were
underway, people took to the streets demanding reforms and chanting the slo-
gan “Wir sind das Volk” (“We are the people”).
The fall of the Berlin Wall
Mass demonstrations started in East Germany in summer 1989. The residents –
increasingly tired with the economic crisis and encouraged by perestroika Gor -
bachev had announced and above all by the changes visible in neighbouring
Poland – were taking to the streets more and more actively, demanding reforms
as part of the existing system. The largest demonstration at that time took place
on 4 November; half a million people went to Alexanderplatz in Berlin. Two days
later a similar number of people were protesting in Leipzig1.
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1 Cf. Christoph Links, Sybille Nitsche, Antje Teffelt, Das wunderbare Jahr der Anarchie. Von der Kraft
des zivilen Ungehorsams 1989/90, Christoph Links, Berlin 2004.
The SED in an attempt to ease the tension in the country announced that pre -
parations were being made to introduce regulations lifting most restrictions on
trips to the West. Günter Schabowski, secretary of central committee, an nounc -
ed at a press conference for foreign journalists on 9 November that East Ger -
many would open its borders immediately2. Thousands of residents of East Ber -
lin and other places near the border rushed towards border checkpoints, where
the surprised border guards opened the gates after a moment of hesitation.
The Berlin Wall, erected 28 years earlier, no longer existed3.
Attempts to save East Germany
The fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, contrary to the presently com-
monly shared belief, did not at all mean that the unification of the two German
states was the only possible scenario into which the situation could develop.
On the contrary, more arguments for maintaining the division were seen in 1989.
The existence of two Germanys was a consequence of the post-war global order
and the balance of powers between the West and the communist bloc. The uni-
fication of Germany was commonly seen as a potential threat to that order.
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the then foreign minister of West Germany, a day after
the fall of the Berlin Wall assured Francois Mitterrand that “unification is not
an issue” in order to allay the French president’s concerns resulting from that
event4.
Bonn was in a way compelled to take more decisive actions as a result of Mik -
hail Gorbachev’s stance. He suggested on 15 November that he would generally
have no objection to a rapprochement between the two German states. Several
days later the chancellor’s office received a list of questions from Moscow re gar -
ding the details of a possible German ‘confederation’. In response to that Kohl’s
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2 Schabowski did not intend to announce the date for opening the border. He was taken by surprise
when a journalist asked him the question, to which he responded that the borders would be opened
immediately.
3 Cf. Patrik von Mühlen, Aufbruch und Umbruch in der DDR. Bürgerbewegungen, Kritische Öffentlich -
keit und Niedergang der SED Herrschaft, J.H.W. Dietz, Bonn 2000.
4 Cf. Alexander von Plato, Die Vereinigung Deutschlands – ein weltpolitisches Machtspiel. Bush, Kohl,
Gorbatschow und die geheimen Moskauer Protokolle, Christoph Links, Berlin 2003.
famous ten-point plan was developed and was presented in the Bundestag on
28 November. The press proclaimed the document a plan for Germany’s unifica -
tion. In fact it provided for establishing closer economic relations, an adjust-
ment of the law and financial aid to East Germany in exchange for democrati-
sation. The plan did not take into account a possible delimitation of the Polish-
German border.
The plan was to be implemented within a time span of at least a few years. How-
ever, the economic situation in East Germany made the events develop much
faster. The West German chancellor saw the economic slump in East Germany
as an opportunity for taking control over the situation there. During Helmut
Kohl’s first visit to East Germany on 19 December, Hans Modrow, the then East
German prime minister, asked him to back his country’s economy with 15 bil-
lion Deutsche Mark. Kohl’s tactical delay made Modrow’s cabinet accept the
conditions of the economic union developed by the West German chancellor’s
office. Briefly, they provided for the introduction of the West German currency
in East Germany and the takeover of full responsibility and also full control of
the East German economy by the West German government. Wanting to avoid
a possible renewal of negotiations with Modrow (whose defence of the East Ger-
man statehood was becoming weaker and weaker due to the fear of his coun try’s
bankruptcy), the CDU led by Helmut Kohl became engaged in the campaign of
its East German sister party, which wanted an immediate unification, during
the elections to the Volkskammer. The Alliance for Germany (Allianz für Deutsch-
land), in which the East German CDU was the leading grouping, scored a sweep -
ing victory in the election, receiving 48% of the votes. 22% of the votes were
cast for the SPD, which was reactivated in East Germany, and 16.4% for the PDS.
The elections revealed the weakness of East German opposition movements.
The Bündnis 90 coalition consisting of various anti-communist groupings re -
ceived support as low as 2.9%. The option which wanted as expedient a unifi-
cation as possible won5.
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5 Cf. Markus Driftmann, Die Bonner Deutschlandpolitik 1989/90. Eine Analyse der politischen Entschei -
dungs prozesse angesichts des Zerfalls der DDR, LIT, Münster 2005.
The four powers
However, the electoral success of the party supported by Kohl still did not de -
cide on unification but only deprived those groups in whose interest it was to
maintain East Germany of influence. The decision on the future of Germany
was up to the powers which had won World War II. This was an effect of the
Allied Declaration as of 5 June 1945 and the Paris Agreements of 1954. In spring
1990 the USA was the only of those four powers to support the unification of
Germany, seeing this as a chance for a further weakening of the USSR and push-
ing it out from Germany. France and the United Kingdom feared the unification
and possible rebirth of the German state’s power. In turn, the USSR correctly
assumed that unification would mean the loss of a part of its zone of influence.
France’s fears were alleviated when Germany made commitments for continu-
ing European integration, and the USSR had to deal with its internal problems.
The British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher remained alone with her resist-
ance and had to relinquish it.
Following a series of meetings and negotiations lasting from May 1990, the Trea -
ty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, also referred to as the Two
Plus Four Agreement (two German states plus the four powers), was signed on
12 September in Moscow to finally open the way to the unification of Germany.
The monetary and economic union. The Unification Treaty
In parallel to the talks with the Allies regarding the international aspects of the
unification of Germany, Bonn and Berlin were negotiating internal issues. Talks
on the monetary and economic union had begun already on 7 February 1990 and
significantly moved forward after the parliamentary elections in East Germany.
East and West Germany signed a treaty establishing a monetary, economic and
social union on 18 May 1990. The most important provisions of the treaty con-
cerned the introduction of the free market economy and the Deutsche Mark in
East Germany.
As the treaty came into effect (on 1 July 1990) and private ownership and free-
market competition rules were introduced, the prices were liberated and the
state monopolies were liquidated, the new federal state faced an economic ca -
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ta strophe. Eastern German companies were unable to compete with the west-
ern ones. At the same time, the traditional outlet for East German products,
namely Eastern Europe, shrank dramatically due to the economic crisis. Accord -
ing to forecasts, the number of unemployed in East Germany would reach 2 mil-
lion by the end of 1991. Although 110,000 new firms were established in east-
ern Germany in 1990, the GDP at the end of the year fell by at least 20% in com-
parison to the previous year. Nevertheless, the reunification’s obvious failure at
the economic level did not prevent a political union. The Unification Treaty (Ei -
nigungsvertrag) between West and East Germany came into effect on 3 October
1990. It envisaged for example “extending the area governed by the West Ger man
constitution” to include the former East Germany according to the procedure
set under article 23 of the Basic Law until a new constitution was adopted;
moving the capital of the united country to Berlin; and the takeover of East Ger -
man debt and national property by West Germany6. This way East Germany
ceased to exist less than a year after the celebrations of its fortieth anniversary.
On 3 October 1990, the two countries extremely different in terms of popula-
tion number, area and level of economic development became one. West Ger ma-
ny incorporated a much smaller area (357,000 km² vs. 108,000 km²), with a popu-
lation of 16 million (64 million in West Germany). The disproportion was strong-
est at the economic level. While the GDP of East Germany in 1989 was equiva-
lent to 207.9 billion euros, West German GDP was worth 1399.5 billion euros7.
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6 Cf. Manfred Görtemaker, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von der Gründung bis zur
Gegenwart, C. H. Beck, Munich 1999.
7 Cf. Gerhard Heske, Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung DDR 1950 bis 1989, Supplement No. 21
(2009), Zentrum für Historische Sozialforschung, Cologne 2009.
1. Society 20 years after the reunification of Germany
1.1. Society is still divided into two parts
Two German societies are still functioning in parallel 20 years on after the coun-
try’s reunification. One was formed in the autocratic system of East Germany,
while the other in the West German democracy. The new generation born after
the reunification of Germany still shares, albeit to a significantly smaller ex tent,
the behaviour models and the mindsets which had developed in the genera-
tions of their grandparents and parents. While designing and implementing
the reunification process in 1990, the politicians focused primarily on adjusting
the political, administrative and economic institutions of East Germany to West-
ern standards. The problem of cultural differences between the two societies
either was unnoticed in due time or was disregarded and repressed from con-
sciousness during the euphoria of reunification. However, a few months were
enough to revise one of the key slogans chanted during the democratic demon-
strations in East Germany: “Wir sind das Volk. Wir sind ein Volk” (“We are the
people. One people”). This appeared to have been wishful thinking and not
a statement of real fact. According to a survey conducted after the reunification
of Germany, most residents of the new federal states believe that the reunifi-
cation and the changes it has entailed have brought them more losses than
benefits (see Table 1).
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Profit
Loss
Both profit and loss
Not applicable/ 
no answer
new federal
states
34%
36%
26%
5%
Table 1. Evaluation of Germany’s reunification. Answer to the question “How do you
evaluate the reunification of Germany 15 years on?” 
old federal
states
31%
36%
25%
9%
ages 18–49
new federal
states
28%
42%
28%
2%
old federal
states
40%
30%
14%
16%
ages 50–59 
new federal
states
33%
29%
32%
5%
old federal
states
25%
29%
41%
5%
ages 60–85
Source: SFZ/Leben 2005 survey
Reunification brought about the transfer of the political system, institutions
and business management rules from the west to the east. However, the con-
tact of the two societies in many cases resulted in culture shock, which finally re -
vealed the distance between them. Both societies reacted with disillusionment,
and the sense of being different, present long before reunification, became of
different nature. The dichotomy ‘we – they’ (previously resulting from the fact
of the existence of two countries separated by the Iron Curtain) was reinforced
with a number of stereotypes: positive regarding ‘us’ and negative regarding
‘them’. The dislike of the communist regime common among western Germans
was transferred towards all residents of the new federal states (‘Ossis’). In turn,
the idealised image of the Federal Republic East Germans had cherished was
replaced with a mix of disillusionment and the feeling of having been wronged.
As early as 1992, 70% of the residents of eastern Germany believed that differ-
ences between them and western Germans were prevalent (20% believed that
they had more features in common); differences were also chosen by 52% of
western Germans (25% indicated similarities). Although some time has passed
since then, the belief that eastern and western Germans have more differences
than similarities has weakened to a very limited extent. A survey conducted in
2009 indicated that 63% of eastern Germans believed that differences are pre -
valent between them and the ‘Wessis’ (only 11% were of the opinion that they
had more similar features). Similarly, 42% of western Germans saw more diffe -
rences and 20% saw more similarities8. Over those two decades, the mutual pre-
judices and the sense of difference, which some publicists call a ‘mental wall’,
have weakened very insignificantly and are still part of the opinion many Ger -
mans share. Therefore, the term ‘reunification’ in this context fails to correctly
reflect the real situation.
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8 Cf. Allensbacher Berichte 7/2009; www.ifd-allensbach.de
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Chart 1. Answers to the question “In what terms, precisely, residents of eastern 
and western Germany are different?” (in %)
Source: Allensbacher Umfrage 2005
1.2. Cultural and social differences
The parallel existence of two German states with extremely different political
and economic systems for almost half a century has led to the development of
different family models, value systems, ways of spending free time and work
ethos – to give only a few examples. Statistical differences regarding the vari-
ous spheres of public and cultural life are, in the opinion of some researchers,
so significant that they have put forward the hypothesis that two different
German nations exist and are suggesting that the only thing they shared at the
moment of the reunification was the literary language9. These are obviously
overstatements. Nevertheless, statistical data have proven in many cases that
the view that two German societies exist is something more than an oversim-
plified cliché being popularised by the conservative western German media.
Statistical differences between the east and west of Germany prove that the
two parts of society are distinct in terms of culture, psychology and mindset.
The most evident divide between the two German societies is present in the area
of religion and attitude to faith. Approximately 73% of residents of western Ger -
many are members of one of the two largest Churches (Catholic and Evan ge -
lical). In the east of Germany, the share of churchgoers is as low as 26%. Socio -
logists expected that the proportions of religious people would gradually reach
similar levels, namely that the east would be rechristianised. Meanwhile, the
trend has been quite the opposite: the percentage of churchgoers in the east is
now even lower than at the time immediately after the reunification (28%). Atti -
tudes to religion affect the points of view in disputes regarding significant social
issues, for example abortion. 50% of residents of the former East Germany are
of the opinion that abortion is admissible if the mother’s or her family’s finan-
cial situation is bad. This view is shared by 30% of the residents of the old fed-
eral states10.
The family models in the old and new federal states have become quite similar
in terms of demographic parameters. For example, the average ages for getting
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9 Cf. Tanja Busse, Tobias Dürr, Das neue Deutschland. Die Zukunft als Chance, Aufbau Verlag, Berlin 2003.
10 Cf. Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften 2008, GESIS-Leibniz-Institut für
Sozial Wissenschaften, Cologne 2008.
married and having the first child are almost identical. Before reunification,
people tended to get married and have children in East Germany at much young-
er ages. However, the perceptions of the family shape and the role models are
still different. The views regarding the woman’s role as well as the models of nur -
sery and kindergarten education which developed in East Germany seem to meet
the requirements of the contemporary labour market better than the views of
many residents of the old federal states. 56% of western Germans believe that
a woman who has a small child should not work. This opinion is shared by 25%
of respondents in eastern Germany. According to 40% of residents in the west-
ern federal states, the woman should be engaged in homemaking and raising
the children for the benefit of her family instead of working professionally, and
should let the man earn the family’s living. This view is shared by 17.8% of resi -
dents in the new federal states. Furthermore, 83% of respondents in eastern
Germany are of the opinion that professionally active women fulfil their fami-
ly obligations in a better way. 53% of residents in the old federal states agree
with this opinion11. At the same time, there is a big difference in the percentage
of illegitimate children between the west and the east of Germany (around 30%
in the western and around 60% in the new federal states)12. Despite a high in -
ternal migration level, only 4% of all marriages in Germany are mixed marria -
ges of people coming from the east and the west of the country13.
Differences in everyday culture or slight differences in behaviour give rise to the
sense of distinctness, the ‘mental wall’ and the collection of stereotypes14. Such
everyday life situations in which the sense of strangeness appears include greet-
ings, behaviour at work and conflict situations.
The manner of greeting is different in the east and in the west of Germany. Re -
sidents of the former East Germany usually shake hands when they meet on an
everyday basis. Meanwhile, in the west shaking hands is a form of greeting re -
served for formal occasions. As a consequence of such inevitable misunder-
standings people become aware of differences in their models of behaviour and
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http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/Publikationen/Fachve
roeffentlichungen/Bevoelkerung/BroschuereGeburtenDeutschland,property=file.pdf
13 http://www.welt.de/vermischtes/article3820575/Der-Mythos-von-den-Ost-West-Ehepaaren.html
14 Cf. Olaf Georg Klein, Ihr könnt uns einfach nicht verstehen, http://www.olaf-georg-klein.de/
downloads/lp_ihr_koennt_uns.pdf
explain this with stereotypes. Western Germans believe that their way of greet-
ing (without shaking hands) proves that they are friendly and easygoing, while
residents of the former East Germany are in their opinion old-fashioned, over-
ly formal and needlessly intrusive. In turn, residents of the new federal states
explain the difference by referring to the arrogance of westerners and poor
manners as opposed to the pleasantness and sociability of easterners15.
During small talk, western Germans usually talk in an optimistic and humor-
ous manner about things that are inessential from their personal point of view,
such as the weather, the condition of the motorways or politics. In turn, in the
east of Germany it is proper to express a critical opinion about the current sit-
uation during small talk. It is also not improper to raise personal issues in this
context. Both models of small talk are intended to create a friendly atmosphere
and serve as an introduction to further topics or as a means of avoiding embar-
rassing silences during chance meetings. The eastern model is seen by west-
erners as a tendency towards constant complaining and dissatisfaction. In this
context, residents of the old federal states describe themselves as optimistic,
bright and discreet. In turn, easterners interpret the difference to their own be -
nefit and see the western residents as superficial, stiff and insincere, and char-
acterise residents of the former East Germany as friendly and tolerant16.
The two German societies define professional success differently and as a result
have different views regarding behaviour at work. Germans from the west are
focused on results and task fulfilment. Professional success is identified with
good achievements in the fulfilment of their obligations. In turn, residents of
the new federal states believe that proper behaviour with regard to their collea -
gues and taking care of good relations with them are the most essential aspects
of work. Success is defined as harmony at the workplace. As a consequence of
such differences, Germans from the east are perceived in the west of the coun-
try as indecisive, not adaptable, passive and lacking initiative. In turn, western
Germans see themselves as decisive, goal-oriented, creative and self-reliant. Re -
sidents of the new federal states characterise themselves as those who are able
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15 H. Berth, W. Wagner, E. Braehler, Kulturschock Deutschland, Europäische Verlags Anstalt, Hamburg
2005.
16 Ibid.
to distance themselves from the work routine and see the higher values, readi-
ly adaptable and not pursuing success at any price. In their opinion, unreason-
able ruthlessness, hunger for power, arrogance, formality and boasting are all
predominant in the west17.
Residents of the old federal states readily engage in disputes and expose diffe -
rences in various situations. Meanwhile, the avoidance of conflict and empha-
sising common features is considered perfect behaviour in the east. In effect, west -
ern Germans determine themselves as sincere, open-minded and direct, while
seeing their eastern neighbours as cowardly, conservative, insincere and oppor-
tunistic. In turn, residents of the new federal states see themselves as loyal,
friendly, helpful and compromising, while characterising their western neigh-
bours as aggressive rabble-rousers and patronising18.
The dissonance between the political and the social realities impedes the for-
mation of a pan-German identity. According to a survey conducted in 2009, 60%
of the residents of the former East Germany do not see the Federal Republic of
Germany as their homeland (although at the same time they would not like the
country to be divided into two again). Around 10% of respondents in the new
fe deral states do not perceive the united Germany as their homeland and would
like the country to be split. At the same time, 25% of residents of the new fede -
ral states see the Federal Republic of Germany as their homeland. A comparable
survey regarding the identity of western Germans would be difficult to con-
duct, given the predominant interpretation of the reunification process as the
incorporation of the German Democratic Republic into the Federal Republic of
Germany. Thus residents of the old federal states identify themselves with West
Germany but often see their compatriots from the east as second-class citizens.
This is an effect of the popularity of the phenomenon commonly called Ostalgie
(i.e. nostalgia for the east) in eastern Germany. In the west, it has a counterpart,
albeit not so well-known, called Westalgie (i.e. nostalgia for the west), meaning
sentiment to West Germany as it was before 1989. In the east of the country,
57% of the residents are of the opinion that East Germany had more positive
than negative features (43% of the respondents believe the opposite) and the
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living conditions in general were better than now19. Almost 65% of residents in
the western part of the country long for the Federal Republic in the shape it
was before reunification (35% do not declare such a longing), i.e. without the
Germans from the east20. Such approaches, especially Ostalgie, are cha rac ter istic
of both the generation who spent at least part of their adult life before the
reunification of Germany and young people, who were born in the united
Germany. However, young people idealise East Germany mainly because they
know very little about what it was really like. While goods imitating those
which could be bought in East Germany as well as films and coffee shops styled
as those before the unification are very popular, young people’s knowledge
regarding everyday life in East Germany is surprisingly poor. Over 70% of pupils
in Brandenburg, who were surveyed by researchers from the Free University of
Berlin in 2007, could not answer 9 of the 18 questions regarding East Germany
they were asked. For example, one in two respondents did not know when the
Berlin Wall was built and destroyed.
1.3. Attitude to democracy and expectations towards the state
Twenty years after the reunification of Germany, a comparison of citizens’ atti-
tudes to democracy21 in the old and new federal states shows residents of west-
ern Germany in a much better light. A significantly larger number of Germans
represent a positive attitude towards democracy in the west than in the east of
the country (see Chart 2).
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19 Cf. Sozialreport 2008, http://www.sfz-ev.de/Publikationen/Sozialreport/SR_2008/SR2008.pdf
20 Cf. Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften 2008, GESIS-Leibniz-Institut für
Sozial Wissenschaften, Cologne 2008.
21 In this context the attitudes are understood not as an approach to the political system but recog-
nising democracy as the best of the existing political systems or satisfaction with the present condi-
tion of democracy in Germany.
Clear caesuras are noticeable in the attitude of eastern Germans to democracy,
which run in parallel to changes in the economic and social situation in the for-
mer East Germany. Support for democracy was quite widespread among the
eastern German public in the initial period, shortly after reunification (1990–
–1995). This was an effect of the belief, which was accompanying the reunifica -
tion process, that the correct direction of the changes in the political system
had been chosen and of the hope of achieving similar living standards as in west -
ern Germany soon. In subsequent years, as the rapid economic development
significantly slowed in 1996 and the consequences of demographic chan ges22
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Chart 2. Percentage of residents of eastern and western Germany who declare 
they are satisfied with democracy
Source: Our own analysis based on data from the Federal Statistical Office
22 Such changes include the faster ageing of society there than in the western federal states due to
the lower birth rate (also because fewer immigrants settle in the new federal states) combined with
the emigration of young, well-educated residents of the eastern federal states to the west of the
country. Many less resourceful and old people living in the new federal states could be classified as
‘transformation victims’, whose living standards deteriorated after 1990 and who found it difficult to
feel at home in the united Germany.
became more palpable, the level of satisfaction with the new political system
rapidly fell in the new federal states. At present, the level of satisfaction with
democracy in the east of Germany is changing similarly as in the west of the
country. In the case of the western federal states, the scale of satisfaction with
democracy reflects the attitude to the policy adopted by a particular fe deral
government and is linked to the global economic slump, which has affected the
economic situation in Germany23. The differences in the approaches to de mo -
cracy of eastern and western Germans also result from the fact that de mocracy
has been present in the old federal states 40 years longer. They are also an
effect of the differences in the socialisation in East Germany, including differ-
ent values, social standards and behaviours which were developing in the family,
at school, in a peer group or via watching and functioning within certain insti-
tutional frameworks (for example, children’s and youth political organisations,
such as Young Pioneers and Freie Deutsche Jugend). The way in which the trans-
formation was taking place, the economic and demographic situation in the
eastern part of Germany and personal satisfaction with the present living stan-
dards have had a strong impact on the different attitudes to democracy. The
lower level of satisfaction with democracy in the east is not an effect of re -
jecting this form of political system per se but rather of the lack of support for
its functioning in Germany. At present, most residents of the new federal states
are dissatisfied with the way democracy is in Germany (see Chart 3). This is
mainly a reaction to – as many residents of the new federal states believe – too
little interest shown by politicians at the federal level to their needs and insuf-
ficient attention devoted to their problems (such as high unemployment) in the
political strategies adopted by subsequent federal governments.
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23 The decrease in declared satisfaction with democracy has been caused by such factors as a grow-
ing unemployment rate in the 1990s, the scandal over the CDU’s financing in 1999 and the reform
package Agenda 2010 being implemented since 2003.
Much as residents of the new and old federal states differ in their satisfaction
with democracy, their understanding of what this notion means, especially with
regard to civil rights and freedoms, is very similar. The differences in the per-
ception of democracy concern mainly economic issues and the degree to which
the state should intervene in the economy (see Table 2).
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Chart 3. Answer to the question “Are you satisfied with the way democracy is functioning
in Germany?” (in %)
Source: Berlin-Brandenburg Social Science Research Centre 2010 Survey
Political freedoms, e.g. freedom of expression
Multi-party system
Citizens’ right to participate in politics
Equality before the law
Gender equality
Greater social equality
More jobs, lower unemployment
Better economic situation
Government control of banks and private companies
Table 2. Understanding the notion of democracy in 2000. Answer to the question 
‘What is closely linked to democracy?’ 
86%
80%
78%
72%
67%
54%
39%
36%
26%
western Germany
83%
79%
78%
72%
58%
58%
45%
45%
40%
eastern Germany
Source: Klaus Schroeder, Die veränderte Republik, Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische
Bildungsarbeit, Munich 2006
There is also a difference in the perception of the state’s role, although the opi -
nion that this has to be a welfare state is predominant in both parts of Ger ma ny.
While 80% of the residents of the new federal states believe that one of the go -
vernment’s tasks is to assure work to everyone who wants to work, this opin-
ion is shared by 62% of residents of the old federal states. According to 83% of
eastern Germans who responded, the state should take efforts to lessen differen-
ces in earnings. In western Germany, 66% of respondents agree with this opinion.
Furthermore, the opinion that prices should be centrally controlled is much
more popular in the east (85% of respondents) than in the west (73%) of Ger -
many. The existence of social inequalities is a positive fact, according to 65% of
western Germans. On the one hand, it reflects the unequal skills and work ethic
of individuals, and on the other it has a motivating effect and encourages peo-
ple to make greater efforts to achieve social advancement. In turn, 42% of east-
ern Germans believe that social inequalities are unjust and, consequently, are
a negative fact24.
While placing the responsibility for their living standards on the government,
residents of the new federal states are significantly less ready to allow the state
to limit their freedom/privacy, even if national security requires that. 40% of
them believe that the state should not be allowed to wiretap citizens even if
this is done in order to prevent potential terrorist attacks. A similar stance is
represented by 26% of the residents of the old federal states25.
1.4. Engagement in public activity
Engagement in public activity and strong civil society structures are one of the
main pillars of the German post-war identity. Proofs of that can be found in the
well-developed German network of institutions devoted to civil education, i.e.
the federal and local Agencies for Civil Education26, and the significance attach ed
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24 Cf. Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften 2008, GESIS-Leibniz-Institut für
Sozial Wissenschaften, Cologne 2008.
25 Ibidem. 
26 Cf. The report by Krystyna Ewa Sielawa-Kolbowska, Agnieszka Łada and Jarosław åwiek-Karpowicz,
Edukacja obywatelska w Niemczech i Polsce, Instytut Spraw Publicznych 2008.
to promoting civil society not only among young people but also among adults.
According to cyclical public opinion polls, 70% of all German citizens older than
14 determine themselves as publicly active, i.e. are engaged in the activity of va -
rious associations, non-governmental organisations, etc. Each subsequent poll
reveals an increased number of such individuals27. The areas which attract the
engagement of the largest number of Germans are sports, activity related to
schools and kindergartens, church and culture. Charity activity is developing at
the highest rate. The least number of people are engaged in politics and the
activity of interest groups, activity for the elderly and in ecology and animal
rights. Those areas of activity are equally popular in both the old and the new
federal states, as is the degree of people’s interest in them.
According to stereotypes still affecting the perception of both parts of Germany,
non-governmental structures are an obvious fact in the old federal states, while
their operation in the new ones is still unsatisfactory. This is, according to popu-
lar belief, an effect of forcing East Germans before the reunification to be enga -
ged to state-linked activity (e.g. the scouting movement, sport clubs or party
membership). After the peaceful revolution, the lack of compulsion to partici-
pate in pro-governmental organisations reportedly revealed that most resi-
dents of the new federal states were engaged only superficially, have developed
a passive approach and are no longer interested in any public activity28. Many
residents of the new federal states are active members of various associations
and some of them, even if their number was small, were engaged in the activity
of democratic opposition in East Germany29, which disproves this stereotype.
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27 An increase by four per cent [there is a movement in Britain to introduce percentage points (pp)
into the British mainstream. However, the Americans have never heard of it and in Britain it’s only
mathematicians who care. Most people are confused by this concept. There are two ways we do it: 
1. Just say ‘four per cent’, 2. Say ‘by four percent to 9.6 per cent’. I leave the choice to the authors...]
in 1999–2004; cf. Thomas Gensicke, ‘Bürgerschaftliches Engagament in Deutschland’, in: Aus Politik
und Zeitgeschichte 12/2006.
28 Cf. Horst Poldrack, Soziales Engagement im Ubruch. Zur Situation in den neuen Bundesländen,
ISAB-Institut für Sozialwissenschaftliche Analysen und Beratung, Cologne 1993.
29 Mainly in the groupings which were operating under the cover of the Evangelical Church, for exam-
ple Schwerter zu Pflugscharen, Frauen für den Frieden, Grün-ökologisches Netzwerk Arche in der
Evangelischen Kirche, Neues Forum, Demokratie Jetzt, Demokratischer Aufbruch – sozial – ökolo-
gisch, Initiative „Frieden und Menschenrechte“, etc. The first groupings emerged as early as 1956.
However, most of them started operating in the 1980s.
According to a survey conducted by AMB Generali-Studie30, 26.5% of the resi-
dents of the new federal states are engaged in public activity, which is ten per
cent less than in the case of western Germans. One of the reasons for their low -
er active engagement can be found in their different socialisation (which parti -
cularly concerns the older generation) and the weaker tradition of public activi -
ty in the eastern part of Germany. However, the main reasons are the lack of
faith that one’s personal engagement may influence reality in any way31 and
a rate of long-term unemployment higher than in the west of Germany, which
causes general dejection and passiveness.
This essential difference in the degree of public activity is noticeable not only
be tween the old and new federal states. There is a clear distinction between
the north and the south in the western part of Germany. While in the south the
percentage of people engaged in the activity of associations and interest groups,
such as student associations, trade unions, etc. is over 45% (Saarland being the
exception), this share dips below 38% in the north (and in the case of Bremen
and Hamburg below 24% and 31%, respectively). Thus it can be concluded that
the degree of participation in activities other than professional work depends
on the size and economic strength of individual federal states. Furthermore,
public activity is significantly more concentrated in non-urbanised areas and
small towns than in large cities across Germany. This is true about both parts
of Germany and is an effect of a stronger sense of identity with the local com-
munity and stronger bonds with religion and the churches in the case of vil-
lages and small towns32.
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Cf. e.g.: Heino Falcke, ‘Unsere Kirche und Ihre Gruppen. Lebendiges Bekennen heute?,’ in: Detlef
Pollack (ed.) Die Legitimität der Freiheit, Verlag Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 1990.
Cf. Ulrike Poppe, ‘Das kritische Potential der Gruppen in Kirche und Gesellschaft,’ in: Detlef Pollack
(ed.): Die Legitimität der Freiheit, Verlag Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 1990.
Cf. Erhart Neubert, Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR 1949-1989, Bundeszentrale für politische
Bildung, Bonn 2000.
30 The survey ‘Engagement Atlas 09’ conducted by Generali Foundation, Cologne 2009.
31 Ibid.
32 Cf. Thomas Gensicke, ‘Bürgerschaftliches Engagement in Deutschland,’ in: Aus Politik und Zeit -
geschichte 12/2006.
1.5. The different versions of history
One of the consequences of the existence of two German societies and at the
same time a factor strengthening this divide is the presence of two different
versions of history in the minds of western and eastern Germans. This is partly
an effect of their dissimilar socialisation processes and life in opposite political
systems, and is partly being preserved by historians who provide various inter-
pretations of German history after 1945. The various stances in this area are
closely linked to political views. Over the past two decades it has been impos-
sible to develop a compromise interpretation of German post-war history, and
scholars in the two parts of the country are still propagating its versions which
cannot be matched.
Research into contemporary history in both West Germany (to a lesser extent)
and East Germany (to a much greater extent) met with attempts of being em -
ployed for current political purposes. The shape of particular theses, concepts
and interpretations strongly depended on the political engagement of the re -
searchers on one of the opposing sides33. The way in which historical processes
and events were explained was to provide grounds for the choice of particular
political decisions from among the range of other options34.
Paradoxically, East and West German politicians alike were using history for the
same purpose: it was to legitimise the existence of their countries and to provide
useful interpretations of the recently ended war. Those interpretations were
supposed to give a sort of absolution and to help building a new ‘positive iden-
tity’. Each of the two German states adopted different ways of attaining those
goals35.
One of the key assumptions which was supposed to legitimise the existence of
East Germany was the statement that it was an ‘anti-fascist’ state (as opposed
to West Germany). According to this, the founding fathers of East Germany
were persecuted and suffered under the Nazi regime to finally overcome evil and
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33 Cf. Mary Fulbrook, Historical Theory, Routledge, London 2002.
34 Cf. Mary Fulbrook, German National Identity after the Holocaust, Polity, Cambridge 1999.
35 Cf. Mary Fulbrook, ‘Approaches to German contemporary history since 1945: politics and para-
digms,’ in: Zeithistorische Forschungen 1/2004.
create a new, better world. The struggle against Nazism, being the main pillar
of the state identity, was supported with numerous research programmes and
pu blications regarding the role of the communist resistance movement. The obli-
gatory application of the Marxist interpretation of history resulted in neglect-
ing the research of the Holocaust as a consequence of the National Socialist
ideo logy. A popular interpretation at that time was seeing Hitler’s rise to power
through the prism of the class struggle theory: Hitler’s victory meant the victo ry
of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat (the latter created East Germany after
the war)36. The view that National Socialism was the bourgeois ideology inher-
ent in this approach automatically made the ‘bourgeois’ West Germany fully res -
ponsible for World War II, branded it as a shelter for Nazis and incubator of fas-
cism, and at the same time absolved the ‘worker’ East German nation of all
blame for German crimes. Facts which might upset this coherent plot of histo -
rical narrative, such as the alliance of Hitler and Stalin at the beginning of the
war, were simply omitted37.
In West Germany the same goals were to be achieved by interpreting the his-
tory of Nazi Germany through the prism of totalitarianism theory. According to
this theory, full responsibility for the recent crimes rested with Hitler and his
closest associates, while ordinary Germans had no influence on the decisions
that were taken. This explanation was developed in the late 1940s and provided
a convenient excuse for West German society’s amnesia regarding its role and
co-responsibility for World War II. The use of such terms as ‘cumulative radica -
lisation’ (meaning toughening the policy with regard to Jews) or ‘Führer’s order’
in academic language enabled a reliable description of the regime’s crimes and
at the same time made the impression that if the crimes has not been commit-
ted by individual people but rather by an entirely passive mass who had been
manipulated by one person. The choice of historical interpretation via politics
had a directly impact on the lives of individual people. The popularity of total-
itarianism theory and the resulting approach to the responsibility of ordinary
citizens for World War II in an incomplete denazification and lenient sentences
imposed on Nazi criminals in the 1950s and 1960s.
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36 Cf. Kurt Pätzold (ed.), Verfolgung, Vertreibung, Vernichtung, Reclam, Leipzig 1983.
37 Ibid.
The reunification in 1990, gave Germans the chance – which historians deemed
a necessity – to write a single version of their post-war history, which would
lay the foundations for the identity of the reunited German nation. Initial
attempts to impose the West German interpretation of post-war history, where
only the West German success story would be described, and East Germany’s
role would be merely mentioned in a ‘footnote on totalitarianism’, proved un -
successful. For obvious reasons such a version was unacceptable for both the
eastern German elite and for most of residents of the new federal states, be cause
it was not ‘their’ history38.
The question of whether or not East Germany was a totalitarian state has been
the core of a dispute ongoing for 20 years, and still no compromise has been
reached. The goal, which many German historians identify with, is to create one
identity of the reunited German nation by developing one version of post-war
history. However, this intention still seems far from being fulfilled. History, in -
stead of serving as a basis for a common national identity, is usually used to pro -
vide grounds for stances taken by political parties on various current policy
issues.
By oversimplifying, one could risk the statement that two approaches are vying
to win recognition. On the one hand, conservative and left-leaning liberal his-
torians from the west believe that East Germany was a totalitarian state, no
dif ferent in any way from Nazi Germany39. They are focusing on describing the
government–citizen relationship. Historians from the east tend to take another
approach, claiming that East Germany was a sovereign country which did not
succeed in the implementation of what was a good idea. Those who support this
option are focused on social and everyday life history and accuse their oppo-
nents of misrepresenting reality by failing to describe the experience of ordina -
ry people who lived in East Germany40.
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38 Cf. Jürgen Kocka, Vereinigungskrise, Zur Geschichte der Gegenwart, Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht, Göttin-
gen 1995.
39 Cf. Konrad H. Jarausch, ‘Die Teile als Ganges erkennen, Zur Integration der beiden deutschen Nach -
kriegsgeschichten’, in: Zeithistorische Forschungen 1/2004.
40 Cf. Mary Fulbrook, ‘Approaches to German contemporary history since 1945: politics and para-
digms,’ in: Zeithistorische Forschungen 1/2004.
One of the arguments used by the supporters of totalitarianism theory is the
thesis which states that the origins of the two German states were completely
different. It is intended to prove that West Germany has been democratic from
the onset (and thus can be used as a founding myth of the reunited Germany),
while East Germany was established as a puppet Soviet dictatorship41. Sup port -
ers of this thesis claim that West Germany was established as a democratic state
and was the second republic in German history as opposed to East Germany,
which was the ‘second dictatorship on German soil’. Another argument raised
by them is that the founding fathers of West Germany provided it with features
deeply rooted in the German political and economic tradition, while in East
Ger many a regime which had nothing in common with the tradition was im -
po sed. Finally, it is typical of totalitarianism theory supporters to claim that
East Germany was a separatist state, which deemed the division of Germany as
being permanent, while the constitution of West Germany included a reunifi-
cation procedure.
In turn, the opinion which is dominant in the new federal states is that in 1949
two states were simultaneously established, and both processes had little to do
with democracy. In both cases the states were established on the initiative of
occupying forces, and Germans were not asked for their opinion. Residents of
the new federal states refute the tradition continuation argument, stating that
although both constitutions in the part regarding basic rights made references
to the Weimer constitution, their details made both of them strongly different
from the original. In turn, responding to the separatism allegation, they quote
statements from East German politicians, who on many occasions invited West
Germany to join East Germany42.
In this dispute, the argument which proves that East Germany was a lawless
state deprived of public support is the fact that political opposition, political re -
pressions and an extensive security apparatus existed there. After reunification,
no other subject was as popular as the opposition and resistance among histo-
rians dealing with East Germany. Historians from the east argue that such an ap-
proach is oversimplified and lacking context. This version fails to take into account
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41 Cf. Henning Koehler, Deutschland auf dem Weg zu sich selbst. Eine Jahrhundertgeschichte, 
Ho henheim Verlag, Stuttgart/Leipzig 2002.
42 Cf. Christoph Klessmann, Die doppelte Staatsgruendung. Deutsche Geschichte 1945-1955, Van den -
hoeck&Ruprecht, Göttingen 1991.
a greater part of East German society, who were neither in opposition nor rep-
resented the communist system. At the same time, historians from the east in
their descriptions of German post-war history tend more and more often to write
about the two German states as if they were completely comparable regimes.
Thus suggestions appear that the Stasi methods were in most cases completely
normal and no different at all from the methods used by Western secret services,
and that the East German border protection complied with international stan-
dards43.
The different visions of history also cause a disagreement between the east and
the west in their evaluation of the events of key significance for German history.
For most residents of the old federal states, the period of National Socialism and
Hitler’s regime decided the present shape of Germany. Meanwhile, the predo -
mi nant view in the east is that the construction of the Berlin Wall and the divi-
sion of Germany had the greatest impact on the present condition of the state
and its global position. At the same time, Nazi crimes committed during World
War II play a minor role in the consciousness of eastern Germans. They are cer-
tainly not seen as a factor which had a significant impact on contemporary
Germany44.
A great part of German historians feel responsible for developing the contem-
porary historical consciousness in Germans. This view is noticeable not only
during debates on museums and places of remembrance (the Holocaust Mu -
seum or the Foundation Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation) but also in their
appeals for the application of certain academic research standards in papers
about German-German history after 1945. This suggests that scholars are to sup -
port the reunification process at the very least45. However, the existence of two
versions of history is a serious impediment in the fulfilment of this task.
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43 Cf. Dietrich Staritz, ‘Widerstand und Opposition, Dissidenz und Resistenz in der DDR’, in: UTOPIE
kreativ (Nov./Dez.) 1998.
44 Cf. Thomas Koch, ‘Ost-Identität. Anker-Anspruch-Anschlussmöglichkeiten’, in: UTOPIE kreativ
(Nov./Dez.) 1998.
45 Cf. Konrad H. Jarausch, ‘Die Teile als Ganges erkennen, Zur Integration der beiden deutschen
Nachkriegsgeschichten’, in: Zeithistorische Forschungen 1/2004.
Against all appearances, discussions on the interpretation of German post-war
history are important not only for a small group of historians and politicians.
The promotion of one or another version of history is a kind of offer to citizens
who could identify with it or use it to brand others. Interpretation of East Ger -
many’s history has a strong impact on relations between eastern and western
Germans. This was indirectly admitted by Joachim Gauck, who said in an inter-
view in 1994 that “East Germans are unfairly seen as snoopers and traitors in
the west, while so many of them refused to collaborate with the Stasi”. The
existence of two versions of history also causes serious problems in developing
a coherent historical policy in this area. If one interpretation is promoted, its
rival version will be automatically rejected. This causes the risk that some citi-
zens, who will not be able to identify with it, will simply reject it. For example,
28% of the residents of the new federal states agree with the opinion that East
Germany was a lawless state, while 41% of them do not agree with this inter-
pretation.
1.6. The unification of institution and the replacement of the elite
One of the major consequences of Germany’s reunification was the transfer of
institutions, branded by some political experts as ‘structural colonisation’46.
The process consisted in transferring the West German legal system, creating
new institutions modelled on those operating in the old federal states and reor-
ganising the administration, the judiciary, education system, economic institu-
tions, welfare and healthcare systems, law enforcement agencies and political
parties. This also entailed the liquidation of institutions which were either inef-
ficient or did not fit into the legal system of the united Germany. The institu-
tional unification also meant the replacement of staff, especially those holding
senior positions. Most individuals who had been working for East German pub-
lic institutions until October 1990 lost their jobs or were demoted. They were
replaced with employees transferred from the old federal states. This process
was the most evident in the case of university academic staff and the person-
nel of economic institutions and law enforcement services.
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46 Cf. Peter Christ, Ralf Neubauer, Kolonie im eigenen Land. Die Treuhand, Bonn und die Wirt schafts
katastrophe der fünf Bundesländer, Rowhlt Verlag, Berlin 1991.
1.6.1. Higher education
The first decisions aimed at adjusting the East German higher education sys-
tem to West German standards were taken under the government of Lothar de
Maiziere, prime minister of East Germany between April and October 1990.
A common (East and West German) education commission was established in
May 1990 to supervise the unification of the two education systems. The real
transformation of universities started when local governments were formed in
the five new federal states. Experts from the old federal states were employed
at the local education ministries. Similarly, professors from West Germany were
nominated heads of newly created or restructured university departments. Their
tasks included adjusting the eastern education system to western standards,
i.e. supervision of investments and the evaluation of academic staff in terms of
their independence from the communist dictatorship, and academic achieve-
ments47. This process was aimed at adjusting the teacher-student proportions
to West German standards (one teacher in East Germany had proportionally
less students than in the west) and removing individuals who had collaborated
with the regime from research and education institutions. In effect, by 1994 over
13,000 positions at universities had been liquidated, and 20,000 more people
(including 5,000 professors) had lost their jobs against their will. Additionally,
8,000 scholars were made redundant because the departments they had been
working at were liquidated (61% of them were from law, economics and social
science departments and 23% from philology and humanities departments).
The consequences of the replacement of the academic elite are readily notice-
able today. At present only three from among the 88 German university rectors
come from the new federal states.
1.6.2. Army
The National People’s Army (NVA) had a reputation of being the second best
equipped and trained armed force in the communist bloc, after the Soviet Army.
Immediately before the reunification of Germany, the NVA had 175,000 soldiers.
According to the reunification treaty, which came into effect on 3 October 1990,
the NVA was to become automatically part of the Bundeswehr. However, Rainer
Eppelmann, minister for defence and the disarmament of East Germany, de facto
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47 Rosalind M. O. Pritchard, Reconstructing education: East German schools and universities after uni-
fication, Oxford 1999.
demobilised the NVA one day before that date. All officers ranked colonel-lieu-
tenant and above and all women, except for military health service staff,48 and
people older than 55 were dismissed. 3,200 from among the 36,000 NVA offi-
cers were transferred to the Bundeswehr (their ranks were reduced by one or
two levels). The only representative of the new federal states among German
generals and admirals is Erika Franke, the head of the Bundeswehr’s Medical
and Sanitary Service Staff. Former NVA officers were classified by the defence mi-
nistry as those who ‘served in a foreign army’ until 2005, and now as those ‘who
served outside the Bundeswehr’. They may not officially use their military ranks
(e.g. ‘retired colonel’ unlike former Wehrmacht and Waffen SS officers) or expect
military funeral honours. The Bundeswehr took over 85,000 military vehicles
with trailers, over 1.2 million handguns, 295,000 tonnes of ammunition, around
4,500 tonnes of liquid rocket propellant, 2,300 fighting vehicles, 5,000 artillery,
missile and air defence systems, around 700 combat and transport aircraft and
192 warships. Most of the National People’s Army’s equipment was destroyed
under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe49.
1.6.3. Diplomacy, economy, the media and politics
Residents of the old federal states are still prevalent in the German elite two
decades after the reunification of Germany. The diplomatic corps is a good
example: no German ambassador comes from the eastern part of Germany. The
new federal states also have fewer representatives in business circles. None of
the DAX component companies has a chief executive officer originating from
eastern Germany. The 54-member board of the Federation of German Industries
includes only one representative of the new federal states. No editor in chief of
the influential daily newspapers circulated across Germany (and published in
the west of the country) comes from the east. The newsroom team of ARD, the
first German TV channel, consists of 29 people, including only 2 from the new
federal states. Similarly, 4 of the 34 members of the newsroom team of ZDF, the
second German TV channel, are eastern Germans. The situation is similar in
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48 Women have been permitted to perform military service as armed staff in the Bundeswehr since
2001. Until then they could only perform medical service or work for the military administration or
orchestra of the Bundeswehr.
49 Andrew Bickford, Soldiers, ‘Citizens and the State: East German Army Officers in Post-Unification
Germany’, in: Comparative Studies in Society and History, no. 51, Cambridge 2009.
local media in the new federal states. In Thuringia alone, as few as 3 of the 20
editors in chief and presidents of the dailies published in this federal state
come from eastern Germany. Regarding political parties, as many as 14 politi-
cians from the eastern federal states are in the 62-member federal board of the
CDU. In the case of the SPD, this proportion is 4 from 46, in the case of the FDP
– 5 from 48, the Green Party – 2 from 6 and the Left Party – 9 from 44. In total,
the new federal states have been represented by 14 ministers (from 131) and 13
parliamentary secretaries (from 206) in the governments formed since the re -
unification of Germany.
All major political parties seek potential voters’ support in the east of Germany.
This has been proven by the parties’ election manifestos: all the political par-
ties holding seats in the Bundestag included provisions in their manifestos
devoted solely to the new federal states. Those provisions concerned primarily
the economy, wage and social insurance system, science and the development
of rural areas in the eastern federal states50. Each parliamentary faction also has
an expert for the development of eastern Germany. The fact that the office of
the Federal Government Commissioner for the New Federal States was establish -
ed in the 1990s (at present, this function is held by Interior Minister Thomas de
Maiziere) is another proof of how significant the new federal states are to indi-
vidual political parties. The commissioner’s role is rather symbolic and consists
in coordinating the government’s policy regarding eastern Germany, mainly
through the supervision of the flow of funds allocated for economic moderni-
sation and supporting the creation of jobs in innovative branches of industry,
such as green technologies and the chemical industry, as well as co-operation
with the interior ministers of particular federal states51.
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50 Cf. Election manifestos of the CDU/CSU, the SPD, the FDP, the Green Party and the Left Party in the
campaign preceding the parliamentary elections in 2009.
51 Many residents of the new federal states see the existence of the office of the commissioner for the
new federal states as needless and discriminatory. In their opinion, the fact that the east of Germany
has been distinguished in the party manifestos and the politicians’ special engagement with regard
to this region simply emphasise the remaining divides in German society.
2. The political system 20 years after the reunification 
of Germany
2.1. Differences in voter turnouts vs. changes 
in the social structure of eastern Germany
Voter turnout in all parts of Germany has been decreasing over the past few
years. This especially concerns participation in elections to the European Par -
liament and, to a lesser extent, local parliamentary elections. German citizens
show greatest interest in elections to the Bundestag. The decrease in turnout is
not so much an effect of dissatisfaction with the German political system as
a consequence of the weakening interest in politics among citizens, the conti -
nuing individualisation of society and changes in the perception of political
activity52. Another major reason is the decline of traditional party electorates in
the western part of Germany and the increasing ineptitude of political parties
in reaching out to voters. This problem is more evident in the new federal states.
In comparison to the first elections after reunification, voter turnout there has
fallen on average by 22 per cent n elections to the European Parliament, by
21 per cent n local parliamentary elections and by 10 per cent n elections to the
Bundestag. The decrease in turnout is more moderate in the old federal states,
respectively 15, 16 and 6 per cent However, turnout is clearly above 50% in the
west and the east alike (see Table 3).
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52 According to sociologists, previously political activity was perceived as membership of political par-
ties. Today, public activity is also more and more often mentioned in this context.
Election
year
1990
1994
1998
2002
2005
2009
77.8%
79%
82.2%
79.1%
77.7%
70.8%
78.6%
80.5%
82.8%
80.6%
78.5%
72.3%
74.5%
72.6%
80%
72.8%
74.3%
64.8%
Table 3. Voter turnout in elections to the Bundestag in 1990–2009
Total turnout
in Germany 
Turnout in the old 
federal states 
and western Berlin
Turnout in the new 
federal states 
and eastern Berlin
Source: Our own analysis based on data from the Bundestag
The decrease in voter turnout in the new federal states is to a great extent
affected by the changing demographic structure in that part of Germany. Since
reunification, many young and well-educated people (especially women) have
emigrated to western Germany and abroad to earn money. This process, com-
bined with a birth rate and foreign immigration rate both lower than in the old
federal states, is one of the reasons why society ageing is faster there than in
the western part of Germany. Since the most active and best-educated people
are leaving eastern Germany, a significant part of its society consists of elderly,
less well educated and less resourceful people and those who find it difficult to
meet the requirements of the labour market. They are often dissatisfied with
the situation in Germany and convinced that their participation in election
does not change much. This is one of the reasons for lower voter turnout than
in the west and for a greater receptiveness to radical views and support for rad-
ical ideas and groupings from the right and the left sides of the political scene.
2.2. People’s attitude to political parties: 
membership and models of voter behaviour
The Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats are the predominant parties
in both the old and new federal states. The CDU has enjoyed the greatest level
of public support in the eastern federal states for years although voters in this
part of Germany are seen as attaching little significance to religion and empha-
sising the significance of social security and the welfare state. Such a set of values
differs quite strongly from typical Christian Democrat views and corresponds
to the Social Democrat values. Despite that, the CDU enjoyed much stronger
public support in eastern Germany than the SPD from the first elections in the
reunited Germany in 1990 up until 1998. This was an effect of the positive asso-
ciation of the Christian Democrats as the force which had contributed to the
reunification of Germany and also of the CDU’s greater opportunities to be ahead
of others in building party structures in the east using the foundations laid by
the former East German democratic opposition53. In turn, the Social De mocrats
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53 Eastern German political parties (which at that time consisted predominantly of many small group-
ings consolidated into blocs before the elections) joined in their western German counterparts as 
a direct consequence of the country’s reunification. This concerned most parties in the new federal
could not make references to the oppositionist tradition and, unlike the CDU,
had to respond to political competition from the PDS, the successor of the com-
munist SED party, which was also making efforts to win the support of the left-
leaning electorate. After the CDU’s electoral defeat across Germany in 1998, the
voters’ sentiments temporarily grew in favour of the SPD, which, however, dra-
matically lost support as a consequence of having adopted in 2003 the radical
reforms of the welfare state called Agenda 201054.
Unlike in the new federal states, the electorate in the west of Germany for years
was clearly grouped according to the division of society into the conservative
and the left-wing camps. Workers traditionally voted for the Social Democrats,
while representatives of the middle class voted for the Christian Democrats.
Those divides could be easily marked on the map of Germany. Depending on
the social structure, some federal states clearly supported one of the two domi -
nant political options. The differences between the political camps in the west-
ern part of Germany are not so obvious any more. The phenomenon of tradi-
tional electorates is vanishing: the Christian Democrats are winning in the
states which have been ruled by the Social Democrats for a long time, and vice
versa. Admittedly, the Christian Democrats are still dominant in the south of
Germany, however their position is no longer strong enough to allow them
govern the states independently and forces them to form coalitions. Local elec-
tion results are also influenced by the performance of the parties at the federal
level. The SPD was weakened due to the long-lasting conflicts between various
‘factions’ inside the party and leadership disputes. However, the greatest role
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states. At the moment, two political parties originating from the East German democratic opposition
exist: the Neues Forum and the Deutsche Soziale Union. However, neither of them plays any essen-
tial role in German politics, and the scope of the Neues Forum’s activity is only regional. The exam-
ples of Bündnis 90, which in 1993 became part of the western-German Green Party, and of the PDS,
which, following the merger with the western-German protest movement WASG, formed the Left
Party in 2007, prove that they could gain a real say in politics only by joining their already existing
counterparts or owing to charismatic politicians from the old federal states. Once the organisational
structure of western German parties was adopted and alliances with politicians from the old federal
states were forged, most representatives of the former democratic opposition withdrew from active
participation in political life and no longer play any major role in the united Germany.
54 Agenda 2010 is a reform package in force since 2005, which was adopted by the SPD/Green Party
government. It envisages the reduction of benefits regarding welfare and the labour market. The re -
forms for example changed the rules of paying unemployment benefits, reduced the job loss protec-
tion, lowered wage-related costs, increased budget expenses on education and raised the retirement age.
in its fall was played by the courageous, if contrary to the party’s traditional
values, Agenda 2010 reform package, which caused a split in the SPD and the
emergence of the WASG protest movement. The mergers of the WASG and the
eastern German PDS spelt the beginning of the Left Party, the most serious rival
for the SPD on the left of the political scene.
A feature which both parts of Germany share is the decrease in support for the
largest parties, which nevertheless keep the dominant position as compared to
the other political groupings. In addition to such causes as decreasing public
interest in politics, individualisation and disintegration of traditional professio -
nal and social communities, this process has also been affected by the program -
mes of the parties, which fail to respond to the current problems and needs of
the voters. Another reason for the fall in popularity of the largest political par-
ties is their opening to new electorates, which often meets with criticism and
even objection from the traditional electorate. This is especially evident in the
case of the SPD, which has been losing the largest share of supporters to other
parties (see Chart 4). The main beneficiaries of this process are the Green Party
and the Left Party, as well as the CDU, which partly owing to this achieved the
best results in the elections to the Bundestag in 2009 in all federal states, with
the exceptions of Brandenburg and Bremen.
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Chart 4. Votes cast by the SPD’s electorate in favour of other parties in the parliamentary
elections in 2009
Source: Infratest Dimap 2009
The greatest differences, as regards the party landscape, can be seen in the
popularity of smaller political parties in both parts of Germany. Those differ-
ences result from such factors as dissimilarities in socialisation55 between the
new and the old federal states, varying degrees of identification with current
politics and approval of the work of subsequent governments and of satisfac-
tion with living standards. Radical views are observed more frequently in the
eastern than in the western part of Germany. This is an effect of negative expe-
riences and public sentiment, a slightly different demographic structure in the
new federal states, and differences in the levels of education and the unem-
ployment rate (see chapter 3.4). This is manifested in a significantly higher popu-
larity of ‘protest parties’ from both the left and right sides of the political scene
(the Left Party on the one hand and the radical right NPD and DVU parties on the
other) in the new federal states56. In contrast, voters in the old federal states place
more confidence in small political parties targeted at the urban electorate, i.e.
people who are well-educated and care for civil liberties and economic liberalism
(the Green Party, the FDP and the Pirate Party, see Maps 1 and 2).
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55 Understood as value system acquisition and the development of social and political views under
the influence of family, school, peer group, political parties, etc.
56 According to experts, the electorate of the radical right parties consists predominantly of young
people representing low education levels.
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Source: Federal Electoral Committee 2009
Map 1. Percentage distribution of votes cast for the Left Party in the elections 
to the Bundestag in 2009
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Map 2. Percentage distribution of votes cast for the FDP in the elections 
o the Bundestag in 2009
Source: Federal Electoral Committee 2009
The fact that western German political parties lack deep roots in the new fede -
ral states also causes differences in the political landscape. First of all, however,
most of them have failed to reach broad communities of voters and to establish
strong electorates. This in particular concerns the FDP and the Green Party.
Those parties’ manifestos based on issues regarding ecology, liberal economy
or the protection of civil rights fail to meet the expectations of the residents of
the new federal states, who are dissatisfied with their living standards and are
or may become unemployed. Radical right parties are an exception among the
smaller parties of western German origin. However, they owe this primarily to
their efficient strategies of winning the electorate through capitalising on peo-
ple’s frustration and dissatisfaction with the economic situation and the cur-
rent politics in Germany and to a much lesser extent reflects eastern Germans’
support for neo-Nazi ideology57.
The two largest political camps, the Christian Democrats and the Social Demo -
crats, have significantly more members in western Germany (see Table 4). How -
ever, the differences in the numbers of those parties’ activists in the east and
the west of Germany are not so dramatic as in the case of the Green Party and
the FDP, around 80% of whose members come from old federal states. Right-
and left-wing protest parties, the distribution of whose members is uneven in
the two parts of Germany, are an interesting case in point. Contrary to wide-
spread opinion and despite the popularity of radical right parties in the new
federal states, most members of the NPD, currently the strongest radical right
party, come from western Germany. In turn, the Left Party, which partly origi-
nates from the post-communist PDS, has more activists in the east; almost 90%
of the Left Party’s members come from eastern Germany. In the new federal
states, their number differs only a little from the numbers of the CDU and the
SPD members. The Left Party is also the second most popular party, after the
CDU, in the new federal states. It has developed into a significant political
force, a kind of mass party, in the east of Germany. The Left also owes this high
level of popularity mainly to its traditions, which are partly rooted in East
German times. It is also the only party operating all across Germany which res-
idents of the new federal states see as understanding their needs and not
rejecting their achievement from the times before the reunification.
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57 Edith Ulrich, ‘Politisch zweigeteilt?’, in: Bürger im Staat, 4/2000, Stuttgart.
2.3. Radical right sentiments
It is commonly believed that the radical right ideology is very popular in the
east of Germany. This is allegedly an effect of the political immaturity of resi-
dents of the new federal states and their dissatisfaction with the way the sys-
tem transformation has been carried out. Young people, who are the most nu -
me rous among the followers of the neo-Nazi ideology in eastern Germany58, are
interested in radical right movements due to unemployment and the feeling of
a lack of perspectives also affects them. One proof of that is the occupational
struc ture of the radical right electorate in eastern Germany; these are mainly
blue-collar workers, individuals who may lose their jobs, and the unemployed59.
Consequently, these are the groups who feel neglected by the main political
parties, dissatisfied with their lives and, as such, are receptive to populist slo-
gans propagated by radical right groupings. Such groupings know how to capi -
talise on this negative potential and adjust their political programmes to the
frustrations and fears of people who feel like transformation victims. The enga -
gement in radical right movements is rather an expression of protest against
the policy of the ‘big’ parties than a consequence of genuine identification of
eastern German young people with radical right ideology. The popularity of the
far right groupings in the new federal states, especially among young people,
is also boosted by the rapidly developing section of the music industry which
propagates neo-Nazi ideas60.
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58 Supporters of radical right ideology in the old states are predominantly old people, whereas in the
new federal states they are mainly young people and young adults.
59 According to a summary published in 2007 by the Bavarian State Agency for Political Education.
Share of eastern
Germans in the total
number of party
membersi
CDU/CSU
8.56%
Table 4. Members of political parties in 2006
SPD
6.89%
FDP
19.59%
Green
Party
14.46%
Left
Party/PDS
89.88%
NPD
37.46%
Source: Klaus Schroeder, Die veränderte Republik, Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische
Bildungsarbeit, Munich 2006
The new federal states are usually high on the ratings in the statistical reports
developed cyclically by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution
(Bundesverfassungsschutz) regarding acts of violence committed by Neo-nazis
in individual federal states. However, crime motivated by neo-Nazi ideology is
a problem in all parts of Germany (see Chart 5). The three federal states where
the rate of this type of crime is the highest include two old federal states: North
Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony. This is linked to the fact that groupings
propagating anti-Islamic slogans and mobilising the residents against the con-
structions of mosques are very active in those regions. Each of those two fed-
eral states have a very large population of immigrants (North Rhine-Westphalia
has the largest number). Local radical right groupings have launched an aggres-
sive campaign against foreigners in this area. In turn, politically motivated
crime in the new federal states results from the fact that there are more neo-Nazis
who do not belong formally to any organisation in the east than in the west of
Germany61 as well as from the intensification of activity by representatives of
western German neo-Nazi circles in the new federal states after the reunifica-
tion of Germany. They are usually members of the subculture unofficially sup-
ported by the NPD and the DVU and of officially unregistered organisations,
such as pupil and student associations, sports clubs, community centres, etc.
The ideological core of neo-Nazi circles, based on anti-democratic, anti-Semitic
and xenophobic views, is the same in both the old and the new federal states.
The essential differences between the east and the west of Germany can be found
mainly in the distribution of nuances within the ideology, the degree of con-
centration of radical right circles and their structures. In the western part of
Germany, they make political capital predominantly on anti-foreigner and anti-
Islamic slogans (with the groupings PRO Deutschland or local PRO NRW and
PRO Köln in North Rhine-Westphalia in the lead). This rhetoric is not equally
successful in the new federal states, where the population of immigrants is
much smaller than in the old federal states. Although hostility to foreigners is
also expressed in the east of Germany, it concerns mainly the labour market.
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60 2009 Report by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution.
61 Members of far-right parties, especially those represented in local communities, are less prone to
commit acts of violence because since they could risk being discredited as representatives of a ‘nor-
mal’ party.
Far-right groupings consciously modify their programmes by including more
and more elements typical of the political left (including labour market protec-
tion, strong government control of the economy, and pro-family and welfare
policy), thus responding to the expectations of potential voters. At some loca-
tions direct references to the East German regime and attempts to rehabilitate
the communist party SED have even been made62.
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Chart 5. Neo-Nazi motivated crime in individual federal states
Source: 2009 Report by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution
62 Such statements could be read for example in a leaflet published by a group of Saxonian socialists
from the NPD in Saxony.
The reforms which have reduced the welfare role of the state as part of Agenda
2010 introduced by the SPD/Green Party government and the consequences of
those reforms, for example restrictions on the payment of unemployment ben-
efits, have contributed greatly to the increase in the political capital of the NPD
and the DVU in the east of Germany. Most of those dissatisfied with this kind
of Social Democratic policy moved their votes to the PDS and some joined sup-
porters of radical right parties. No similar trend has been observed in the old
federal states.
2.4. Radical left sentiments
For historical reasons, radical right circles are seen in Germany as a greater threat
to law and order than far-left groupings. The latter are also being watched by
the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. However, they have
been researched to a significantly lesser extent, and have received less atten-
tion from experts and agencies dealing with civil education63. The fact that the
media and politicians show less interest64 in the radical left’s activity gives the
impression that such activity is made light of or even given tacit consent as being
less harmful than membership of neo-Nazi organisations. Meanwhile, it can be
concluded from the annual reports of the Federal Office for the Protection of the
Constitution that far-left circles show an increasing potential violence for vio-
lence65. The radical left is more active in the west of Germany because its ide-
ology meets with better understanding in the wealthier federal states. For this
reason, the largest number of acts of violence motivated by far-left ideology are
committed in the old federal states. Berlin, being the capital city and the place
where the key state offices are located, is an exception in this context. The
wealthiest new federal state, Saxony, is ranked as low as sixth (see Chart 6).
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63 One proof of this is the disproportion in the number of publications and public actions against radi -
cal ideologies. The Agencies for Civil Education have held numerous lectures and seminars aimed at
increasing public awareness of the threats posed by far-right movements, at the same time paying
very little attention to issues linked to the radical left.
64 The minister for family affairs, Kristina Schröder (CDU), who was nominated in 2009, was the first
senior official to include the issue of combating leftist extremism in her programme. However, her
plans are quite vague.
65 An increase by over 50 per cent in 2008–2009.
The most important of the organised radical left groupings in Germany is the
Left Party. This party was created in 2007 as a result of the merger of the PDS
and the WASG66. The PDS had enjoyed a dominant position on the left side of
the political scene in the east of the country even before that, and this position
did not change after its merger with the WASG. The establishment of the Left
Party, which represents a wide range of views, has made it necessary for most
groupings operating in the old federal states (including the Trotskyist faction67
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Chart 6. Far-left motivated crime in individual federal states
Source: 2009 Report by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution
66 The Left Party is a very non-homogeneous body, which is divided into numerous factions, includ-
ing the Anti-Capitalist Left, the Communist Platform, the Socialist Left, the Reformative Faction, the
Emancipation Left and the Democratic Socialism Forum.
67 The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution in 2009 registered 20 international
Trotskyist groups, which had in total 1,600 members.
and the German Communist Party DKP68) to co-operate with it and officially
support it. Furthermore, the emergence of a serious political competition has
caused a loss of support for the other groupings, disputes about the directions
in which their programmes should develop and even financial problems result-
ing from the decrease in the number of their members69. The only grouping to
have kept a cool-headed approach towards the Left Party is the Marxist-Leninist
Party of Germany70, a marginal grouping operating mainly at the local commune
level in western Germany (until 2009 it had its representatives on the councils
of several communes in North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg). How-
ever, it has also lost members since the establishment of the Left Party: by 13%
in 2009 as compared to 2008.
Left-wing extremism is significantly less organised than right-wing extremism.
It is represented mainly by what are named ‘autonomous circles’. Far-left group-
ings operate in a similar way in both parts of Germany. They are concentrated
in big cities and are prone to using violence. They have around 6,600 members
across Germany, according to the Federal Office for the Protection of the Consti -
tution. The office sees the greatest threat in their inclination to commit serious
crimes, including arson, which may have accidental victims, whose health and
lives may be put at risk. The far-left circles, in the west and in the east of Ger -
many alike, share the following four major ideological principles: anti-capitalism
and the fight against right-wing extremism, opposing globalisation, anti-mili-
tarism and opposing state control of citizens71. These circles are popular predo -
mi nantly among young people in the old federal states for similar reasons as
the far-right groupings are among young people in eastern Germany: thus they
express their protest and dissatisfaction with their personal situation and also
with the way the political system is functioning. Unlike radical right move-
ments, leftist circles have a serious intellectual base since far-left activists are
better educated and have higher aspirations.
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68 The party was established in 1968 in Essen and had 4,000 members in 2009. In the 2009 election
to the Bundestag it put up candidates only in Berlin, winning 0.1% of the vote.
69 2009 Report of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution.
70 The party was established in 1982 in Gelsenkirchen and had 2000 members in 2009. It won 0.1%
of the votes in the election to the Bundestag in 2009.
71 According to the 2009 Report of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution.
The most noticeable areas of activity in which both official and secret far-left
organisations are engaged72 are anti-globalism and anti-Nazism. The most fre-
quent manifestation of radical left activity in the east of Germany is the fight
against right-wing extremism. The strong concentration of informal neo-Nazi
groups and their demonstrations often provoke fierce clashes between the two
sides (see Table 5). The disproportion in the number of mutual acts of violence
between the radical right and left circles has become more evident over the
past year. The number of crimes based on such motives has fallen in neo-Nazi
circles and has significantly increased among the representatives of the radical
left. This trend fits in with the increasing radicalisation of the political left
linked partly to the economic crisis and the resulting hostility towards finan-
cial institutions and their representatives, as the Federal Office for the Pro tection
of the Constitution has noted.
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72 This distinction is made in the report of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution,
according to which, secret activity is much more dangerous.
Attempted murders
Bodily injuries
Arson
Detonation of an explosive
Disturbing law and order
Disorganising railway, air, maritime or street
traffic
Deprivation of liberty
Robbery
Blackmail
Resistance while being arrested by the Police
Total
Table 5. Acts of violence committed by representatives of the radical right against 
representatives of the radical left and vice versa
2008
0
322
5
0
24
1
1
4
1
0
358
2009
2
251
5
0
29
0
1
4
2
6
300
Radical right activity
2008
3
220
20
0
54
6
0
12
2
25
342
2009
0
304
19
2
59
4
1
22
2
55
468
Radical left activity
Source: Our own analysis based on the 2009 Report of the Federal Office for the Protection 
of the Constitution
3. Economy
Despite the funds the new federal states have received and are still receiving
for economic reconstruction, the condition of the economy and the costs of living
in eastern Germany are still significantly different from western German stan-
dards. One of the assumptions made during the work on the reunification treaty
was that the transfer of funds to eastern Germany would result in a large number
of new jobs, a modernisation of the infrastructure and, finally, the achie vement
of similar living standards in both parts of Germany within two decades. At the
time of the reunification, East German GDP per capita was equi valent to 44% of
the West German GDP per capita. This difference is much smaller now. In 2010, GDP
in the new federal states was equal to 70% of GDP in the old federal states (see
Chart 7). In the first years of the transformation the economy in the new feder-
al states was growing at an equal and even higher rate than the old federal states.
Between 1990 and 1996, GDP in the new federal states was growing much faster
than in the old ones. This was mainly an effect of the rapid development of the con-
struction industry owing to the subsidies for the modernisations of the infra-
structure in the new federal states and tax relief on investments in real estate.
This caused excessive supply on the real estate market and a breakdown of this
sector after tax relief was liquidated. This in turn, in addition to other factors, re -
sulted in a long-lasting slowdown in economic growth in the new federal states.
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Chart 7. GDP per capita in the new federal states in 1991–2009 as compared to GDP 
per capita in the old federal states (in %)
Source: German government’s report on the unity of Germany of 2010
The scenario, according to which the eastern German economy, which had to
start practically from scratch in the new reality, would reach western German
levels within a time span as short as twenty years, has turned out to be unrealis-
tic. The most optimistic forecast at present states that the new federal states
will reach at the most 80% of the western German industrial production level
when the transfer of funds as part of the second solidarity package ceases in
2019. The levels are not expected to become totally equal earlier than 50 years
from now.
3.1. Subsidisation of the new federal states
In the initial transformation period, funds for the modernisation of the eastern
German economy and infrastructure were coming from five different sources
(see Chart 8). In addition to money from the federal budget, for example in the
form of solidarity packages, and the funds allocated by the better-off old fed-
eral states for reducing economic differences between particular federal states,
eastern Germany was also granted funds by the European Union starting from
1991. Most of the funds were and still are allocated from the federal budget as
part of the ‘reconstruction of eastern Germany’ (Aufbau Ost73).
The first funding source in 1990–1994 was the German Unity Fund (Fonds
Deutsche Einheit), which was established with the intention of fulfilling West
Germany’s obligations under an agreement with East Germany as of 18 May 1990
and of settling the payment of funds allocated for the support of East Germany.
A total of 82.2 billion euros was paid throughout the period of the fund’s opera -
tion, almost 49 billion of which came from loans and almost 34 billion – from sub -
sidies funded by the central budget and the budgets of individual federal states.
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73 Financial investments aimed at the reconstruction and development of eastern German economy and
institutions. 
The fund was replaced with solidarity packages. The underlying task of these
was to contribute to an equal level of infrastructure in both parts of Germany.
The first solidarity package, which applied in 1995–2004, was worth around
105 billion euros. Numerous cases in which funds from this package were spent
contrary to their intended use (for example, on old-age and disability pensions
due from special East German funds and not on infrastructure) provoked sharp
criticism of the new federal states from the west of Germany. The old German
federal states, in spite of problems with their own budgets, had to co-finance
the modernisation of the new federal states. In a debate preceding the creation
of the second solidarity package it was even suggested that a mechanism of
sanctions be developed which would be imposed on those federal states which
spent money for purposes other than those it was allocated for. According to
calculations made by the institution in charge of allocating federal funds for
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Source: Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) 2009
Chart 8. Net funds paid to the new federal states, excluding support from the EU 
(in billion euros)
special purposes74, in 2003 alone, 71.3% of subsidies were spent contrary to their
intended use in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 66.6% in Saxony-Anhalt, 54.8% in
Brandenburg and 32.5% in Thuringia. Berlin used the whole sum of the subsidy
for purposes other than intended. Saxony was the only federal state to have fol-
lowed the guidelines75. Despite that, in 2001 the Bundestag voted in favour of
the continuation of the programme and adopted the second solidarity package,
which took effect in 2005 and will apply until 2019. The federal budget will
allocate 156.5 billion euros as part of this package for the development of east-
ern Germany. According to estimates made by the Halle Institute for Economic
Research, the eastern German economy received a total of approximately 1.3
trillion euros in subsidies between 1990 and 2009. Most of the subsidies were
spent on purposes linked to social policy. Investments which supported the
modernisation of the economy accounted for around 10% of all subsidies76.
According to data published by the German government in the first report on
German unity of 1997, the new federal states received 13.64 billion euros in
1994–1999 as part of European structural funds. Approximately 23 billion euros
was granted in 1996–2008 to the new federal states for the modernisation of
agriculture (which accounted for 34% of all funds granted to Germany in that
period). Over 18 billion euros was received as part of structural funds within
the same period. By the end of 2013, the new federal states will have received
a total of 16.5 billion euros from the European Union’s structural funds, includ-
ing 1.5 billion for the development of infrastructure and around 1.3 billion for
labour market revival and education.
Many decisions implemented since the reunification of Germany with the aim
of revitalising the economy of the new federal states, such as those regarding
swift currency reform, modernisation of industry and privatisation, turned out
to be less successful than expected. Not only did they fail to assimilate the living
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74 Sonderbedarfs – Bundesergänzungszuweisung (SoBEZ) grants funds to those federal states whose
financial level, despite the equalising subsidies transferred between individual federal states, is be -
low 99.5% of the average financial level of all the federal states. The allowance covers 77.5% of the
difference.
75 Klaus Schroeder, Die veränderte Republik, Bayerische Landeszentrale für Politische Bildungsarbeit,
Munich 2006.
76 2008 Report of the Halle Institute for Economic Research.
standards in the old and the new federal states but they also entailed much high-
er than planned social costs. This especially concerned the rapid increase in the
unemployment rate, including long-term unemployment. Furthermore, the pri-
vatisation of eastern German businesses by the Trust Agency for Privatisation,
a body established in 1990 by the East German Council of Ministers, also raised
numerous controversies. This institution was established for the purpose of pri -
vatising East German companies. The economic breakdown in the former east-
ern bloc resulting in a cessation of orders from Eastern Europe (which had been
the key trade partner for those companies) combined with the replacement of
the East German mark with the Deutsche Mark at the 1:1 rate put the companies,
which had been doing very well before, into serious trouble. The privatisation
and transformation of most businesses, especially factories, was also necessary
because their equipment was outdated and the technological processes as a rule
failed to meet western German standards. The activity of the Trust Agency cov-
ered over eight thousand firms employing in total around four million people.
The agency was also privatising agricultural land (around 2.5 million ha), assets
of the East German Ministry of State Security, part of the real estate previously
owned by the army, and political parties’ assets. The privatisation of the machi -
ne-building, energy, food and construction industries especially adversely affect-
ed the lives of the new federal states’ residents. The Trust Agency usually split
large businesses into smaller entities and sold those to investors. The criterion
by which the investor was selected was often not the purchase price offered
but rather the tempo of the deal77. The agency’s staff was on the whole made
up of western Germans. Since the commission fee they received depended also
on the tempo of the sale of the businesses, most of them focused on selling the
East German firms as soon as possible. This offered a good opportunity for
western German legal entities to take over firms in eastern Germany at relati vely
low prices. In many cases those firms were wound up shortly after the take -
over. Fraud also happened, the scenario usually being the following: a western
German investor took over a firm and received a subsidy for revival of compa-
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77 For example: Klaus Schroeder, Die veränderte Republik, Bayerische Landeszentrale für Politische
Bildungsarbeit, Munich 2006; Franziska Augstein, ‘DDR: Treuhandanstalt. Ausverkauf der Republik’,
Süddeutsche Zeitung 11 November 2009. This thesis has also been supported by experts from Halle
Institute for Economic Research and Dresden Institute for Economic Research.
nies in the east of Germany, and shortly thereafter caused its bankruptcy78.
Even today, most of the firms operating in the new federal states are owned by
either western German or foreign investors. What has changed is the manage-
ment staff: at present, individuals from the new federal states hold most of the
managerial positions in those firms.
When the Trust Agency was liquidated in 1994, a debt of around 100 billion
euros remained, partly resulting from supporting production at the plants and
the wage obligations of the eastern German companies. The debt was taken
over by the Redemption Fund for Inherited Liabilities (Erblastentilgungsfonds),
which was established as part of the first federal solidarity package. The com-
petences of the Trust Agency for the Privatisation were distributed among
smaller institutions, such as the Federal Agency for Special Tasks Related to the
Reunification (BvS), the Trust Agency’s real estate company (TLG Immobilien
GmbH) and the company for the usufruct and management of land (BVVG).
3.2. Living standards in the old and the new federal states
The economic indicators prove that the new federal states have made a leap
forward since 1990 in terms of the GDP per capita value, wage size, labour effi-
ciency, production efficiency and even the reduction of the unemployment rate.
The new federal states’ GDP in 2000 was equivalent to around 117% of East
Germany’s GDP in 1989. Between 2000 and 2009, GDP grew by 19% in the new
federal states and by 16% in the old ones (see Chart 9).
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78 One of the best known examples of intentional activity to the detriment of eastern German enter-
prises was the takeover of the shipyards in Wismar and Stralsund and of the Diesel factory in Rostock
in 1992 by Friedrich Hennemann, the then owner of Vulkan shipyard in Bremen, in order to provide
funds for the shipyard in Bremen, which was facing bankruptcy. In 1995 first charges appeared that
the corporation’s management had used EU subsidies, worth approximately 430 million euros, allo-
cated for the reconstruction of eastern German shipyards, for purposes other than those intended. As
a consequence, litigations were started against the directors of Vulkan AG, and the Trust Agency sued
the corporation for damages.
Despite that, other countries from the former eastern bloc, for example Poland,
were developing at a higher rate than the new federal states. With the exception
of the first years following the transformation, Poland’s GDP was growing at
a rate twice as high as that of the new federal states of Germany (see Chart 10).
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Chart 10. GDP growth rate in the new federal states and in Poland in 1992–2009 (in %)
Source: Our own analysis based on data from the statistical offices of individual federal states and Poland’s
General Statistical Office
Chart 9. GDP in the old and new federal states in 1991–2009 (in billion euros)
Source: Our own analysis based on data from the statistical offices of individual federal states
Export growth rate has been higher in the new federal states than in the old
ones. This is so because production in the new federal states is oriented pri-
marily to the domestic market. According to the federal government, production
efficiency in the new federal states has reached 79% of the efficiency level in the
western federal states79. For comparison, this ratio was 25% in 1989 (see Chart 11).
The difference between the two parts of Germany partly results from the sub-
sidising of uncompetitive branches of industry in the east and the dissimilari-
ties in the structure of the sectors which form the economies of the old and the
new federal states. Eastern Germany has to change its economic profile in order
to be able to reach the economic level of the old federal states. Although western
German firms have their branches in the new federal states, these entities pre-
dominantly deal with processing production. Innovation and research centres
developing new technologies are still located in the old federal state, which
reduces the competitiveness of eastern German companies. All those factors
result in lower incomes per capita in the new federal states. Chart 12 illustrates
changes in the distribution of income per household in both parts of Germany
and a gradual increase in the prosperity of residents of the new federal states,
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Chart 11. Production efficiency in the old and the new federal states in 1991–2008
Source: 2010 Report of the Federal Ministry for the Economy and Technology
79 According to the federal government’s annual report on German unity of 2009.
although the difference in comparison to the level in the western part of Ger -
many is still very large.
A comparison of the debt levels in individual federal states reveals that the
budgets in the new federal states are less indebted than in the old federal sta -
tes. In 2008, the federal state with the highest debt was Bremen, ranked before
Berlin, Hamburg and Saarland. Excluding Berlin80, which is a special federal state
given its status of the country’s capital city, the most indebted federal state in
eastern Germany (and the fifth most indebted in Germany as a whole) is Saxo ny-
Anhalt. In turn, Saxony, after Bavaria, is the state which can boast the second
lowest debt level81. The very high debt levels in the old German states result to
a great extent from the financial burdens they have to take to help modernise
the east of Germany.
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80 West Berlin depended on subsidies from the federal budget and had no developed industry struc-
ture even before reunification.
81 According to estimates of the Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft.
Chart 12. Average annual income per household (in euros)
Source: Federal Statistical Office
However, economic development and the debt levels lower than in the west of
Germany have failed to bring the level of wages and prosperity in the new fed-
eral states closer to the western German standards or to durably reduce the un -
employment level in the east of Germany. The number of people who have no
regular jobs and receive unemployment benefit has remained at the same level
for years in the new federal states. The unemployment rate there is almost dou-
ble the rate in western Germany82. Vast differences are also evident in the distri -
bution of wealth. In 2007, the average net savings of residents per person were
worth over 100,000 euros in western Germany and around 31,000 euros in east-
ern Germany83. This gap is especially large between the oldest residents (see
Chart 13) of the new and the old federal states.
The average value of old-age pensions in the new federal states is higher than
in the old federal states. In the case of men this is on average 1,043 euros in
the east and 967 euros in the west, and in the case of women 669 euros and
468 euros, respectively84. Those differences result partly from the longer em -
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Chart 13. Savings in the old and the new federal states in 2007 (in euros; per resident)
Source: 2009 Report by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW)
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82 According to data from the Federal Labour Office, the unemployment rate in May 2010 reached
12.1% in the eastern federal states and 6.6% in the western federal states.
83 Joachim R. Frick, Markus M. Grabka, Gestiegene Vermögensungleichheit in Deutschland, German
Institute for Economic Research, Berlin 2009.
84 Data for 2008.
ployment periods in the former East Germany and are especially large in the
case of women.
3.3. Household debt and the cost of living 
in the east and the west of Germany
To western Germans, life in the new federal states may seem easier because
many goods and services are cheaper there. In fact, the difference is not as big
as is commonly believed: prices in the east of Germany are approximately 5.6%
lower than in the west. Many services and goods have similar prices85. Real
estate, rent, driving courses, taxi tariffs, craftsman services and medical insur-
ance premiums cost less in the east of Germany. In turn, electricity and gas
prices are higher in the new federal states. However, according to calculations
made by the consumer portal Toptarif, differences in electricity prices have
been undergoing a gradually reduction (from 6.5% in 2008 to 4.9% in 2010 on
average) through unequal electricity price raises in the two parts of Germany.
Price differences are partly compensated by wage differences; the wages in the
new federal states are lower than in the old ones. In 2008, the average annual
income per household in the east of Germany was 16% (i.e. 3,500 euros on aver-
age) lower than in the west86. When income purchasing power (lower in the
east of Germany) is considered, it turns out that 19.5% of eastern Germans and
12.9% of western Germans are at risk of poverty87. However, there are also clear
differences between the wealthier south and the poorer north in both parts of
Germany in this context, as well.
Although the average household in eastern Germany is less prosperous, the
level of its indebtedness is stable and reaches approximately half the level seen
in western Germany. According to data for 2007, average household debt reach -
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85 For example, the price of a railway ticket, a new car or telecommunication services; cf. Rupert
Kawka, ‘Regionale Preisunterschiede in den alten und neuen Ländern,’ in a newsletter ifo Dresden
Berichtet 2/2010 published by the Dresden branch of the Munich Institute for Economic Research.
86 Cf. Newsletter of the German Institute for Economic Research, no. 51-52/2009, Berlin.
87 Data according to the 2009 Atlas of Poverty illustrating the geographical distribution of areas most
affected by poverty in Germany, published by the association of social movements Paritätische.
ed 9,477 euros in eastern Germany and 20,815 euros in western Ger many88. One
of the reasons for this uneven distribution of debt are the higher costs of living
in the old federal states, including significantly higher prices of real estate, the
main purpose for which loans are taken. Thus, the most expensive real estate
is located in the best-developed south-western federal states. According to the
estimates presented by Stern weekly magazine, the average price per square
metre of an apartment in Munich in 2007–2008 was 3,190 euros. The price per
square metre in Güstrow district (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) was 470 euros.
3.4. Education level and migration as a determinant 
of the development of the eastern and the western federal states
The wages of the residents of the eastern federal states do not depend suffi-
ciently on the level of their education. According to a microcensus conducted
in 2005 by the Federal Statistical Office, more eastern than western Germans
aged 30-60 hold certificates of graduation from Realschule, which allows for the
continuation of education at Gymnasium and taking the secondary school gradua-
tion examination and starting university studies.
However, most residents of the old federal states hold a certificate of gradua-
tion from a Hauptschule (lower secondary school) after which education can be
at a vocational level. Despite a noticeable increase in the number of secondary
school graduates in the new federal states in 1998–2007 (by 10 per cent, their
number is still much lower than in the west (on average 124,000 more western
than eastern Germans graduate annually from a secondary school and receive
a secondary school graduation certificate)89. The number of people with high or
vocational high education is similar in the east and the west of Germany.
In turn, more people discontinue school education in the eastern than in the
western part of Germany: respectively 9.6% and 7.4%.
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88 According to the survey ‘Socio-Economic Panel’ (SOEP), which is cyclically conducted by the German
Institute for Economic Research (DIW), the difference in household debt levels between the new and
the old federal states have remained stable, although the average debt rate in surveyed households
has increased in both parts of Germany.
89 According to the Federal Statistical Office.
A higher level of education in the new federal states does not guarantee wages
equal to those in the old federal states (although incomes in line with qualifi-
cations). For this reason, a significant number of well-educated people emigrate
to the old federal states. This especially concerns well-educated young Germans;
over 60% of Germany’s internal emigrants are under 30. Women are predomi-
nant in this group, which in the longer term will entail a lower birth rate and
significantly faster ageing of society in the east than in the west of Germany.
It is estimated that around two million people have moved to the western fede -
ral states since reunification. The number of new residents in the eastern fed-
eral states does not compensate the number of those who have moved out (see
Chart 14). This problem is particularly acute in Saxony-Anhalt, whose popula-
tion fell by 15.6% in 1991–2008, but is also present in all the eastern federal
states. The least number of people emigrate from Brandenburg and Berlin.
Emigration in the eastern part of Germany varies in terms of scale and direc-
tions, depending on whether those are urban or rural locations and on the level
of economic development in a given place. The population decrease in well-
developing cities, which are centres of industry, culture and also academic life,
is much smaller than in rural areas, which offer little opportunity for career
development90. Those positive examples obviously do not refer to all big cities
in the new federal states. However, this trend, which is beneficial for the devel-
opment of the new federal states, has been growing noticeably recently91.
This difference in the development of urban and rural areas in both parts of
Germany, also in terms of population numbers, is likely to become entrenched
in the next few years. As the offer of universities in the new federal states
becomes more attractive, immigration from the old federal states may become
more popular. As a consequence, this will cause a more rapid development of
some centres in the most prosperous regions of eastern Germany and an
increase in the disproportion of living standards between them and the less
developed regions in the east of Germany.
O S W  S t u d i e s
P
a
rt
 3
. 
E
c
o
n
o
m
y
66
90 Report ordered by the Tagesschau news service of German TV channel one, ARD, on 3 October 2009.
91 For example, Magdeburg, the capital city of Saxony-Anhalt, in 2009 had a positive migration bal-
ance for the first time since reunification. This trend is expected to continue in the coming years.
3.5. Pre-school and school education
The new federal states, given their history and economic backwardness when
compared to the old federal states, are seen as a region which has nothing
attractive to offer and which only copy western German models and solutions.
Meanwhile, there are some areas which are functioning better in the east than
in the west of Germany. These include nursery and kindergarten care and ele-
mentary, secondary and higher education.
The eastern federal states have a much broader offer covering institutionalised
childcare92; this being a remnant of the East German welfare system. The sig-
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Chart 14. Population changes in the new federal states over 1991–2008
Source: Data from the statistical offices of individual federal states
92 In the rankings of childcare offer in individual federal states, the best western state, Hamburg, 
is as low as seventh position.
nificance of care and education of young children is emphasised by politicians
at the federal level in the context of the integration of immigrants (including
linguistic integration). Furthermore, ministers dealing with family issues in sub -
sequent federal governments have put eastern German nurseries and kinder-
gartens forward as examples of perfectly functioning institutions which con-
tribute to the professional activation of women. In the old federal states, around
4% of children attend nurseries and 75% kindergartens, while in the new fede -
ral states these ratios are 14% and 85%, respectively93. The time children spend
at nurseries and kindergartens during the day also differs. Parents in western
Germany prefer places which accept children for half the day (80% of the children
spend only the mornings at nurseries and kindergartens), while parents in the
east of Germany prefer places where they can leave their child for the whole day.
Most eastern German federal states have not adopted the school education sys-
tem applicable in the west of Germany. The secondary education is still divid-
ed into Gymnasium (for children to age 10, from the fourth grade of elementary
school, Grundschule) and (depending on the specific federal state) Mittelschule
or Regelschule (to which children go until aged 15-16, after they have complet-
ed the elementary education level extended to five years). Some experts believe
that this model does not divide children into the better and the worse ones at
an early stage of education as happens in the western federal states and offers
greater opportunity for pupils who have worse results to catch up with their
peers (pupils in the west of Germany usually choose the kind of upper elemen-
tary school after the fourth grade). This is one of the reasons why schools from
the eastern federal states regularly achieve better results in the Programme for
International Student Assessment (PISA)94. Successes such as these for pupils
from the new federal states make the ministers in charge of school education
more inclined to consider a possible reform of school education in the west of
Germany95.
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93 Survey conducted by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in 2002.
94 Saxony was ranked first among all federal states in 2008.
95 For example, the minister for culture of Baden-Württemberg, Helmut Rau (CDU), who ordered a com-
parative study of achievements of students from Saxony’s Mittelschulen and students at comparable
ages in Baden-Württemberg.
Additionally, eastern German universities and other higher education facilities
are becoming increasingly attractive, including to students from the old federal
states. The lack of tuition fees, which is the main reason why students from west-
ern Germany decide to study in the east, is not the only advantage96. Higher
education facilities in eastern Germany also offer better equipment, the possi-
bility of individual contact with the tutors (which is difficult at the overcrowded
western German universities) and interdisciplinary studying opportunities as is
not the case in universities in the west of Germany. These benefits were appre-
ciated by 7,800 students from the western federal states in the academic year
2006/2007. Admittedly, this is significantly less than the number of eastern Ger -
man students who move to the west of Germany to study (13,700); a continu-
ing upward trend is noticeable in both of those groups97. It turns out that sec-
ondary school graduates from the new federal states who choose to study in
the west of Germany are guided by such criteria as the reputation of the uni-
versity, the attractiveness of its location and the faculty offer. In turn, students
from the old federal states who choose to study in eastern Germany base their
choice on the lack of tuition (students have to pay for studies at most univer-
sities in western Germany), university equipment and living costs.
3.6. The infrastructure
Modernisation of the infrastructure is definitely a benefit the new federal states
have reaped from reunification. According to calculations by the Halle Institute
for Economic Research, 67% of the total amount of funds allocated for the sup-
port of economic transformation in the eastern federal states in 1991–2009
was spent precisely on the modernisation of infrastructure, especially roads, but
also telecommunication infrastructure and the renovation of buildings. During
reunification, according to the estimates presented in the government report,
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96 Pursuant to the federation reform applicable since 2006, the competences regarding higher educa-
tion are shared between the federation (to the extent covering admitting candidates to study and
conferring academic degrees) and in a greater part the federal state in which a given higher education
facility is located. It is up to the parliament of a given federal state to decide whether or not to in tro -
duce tuition fees for studies.
97 Cf. Christoph Heine, Studienanfänger in den alten und neuen Ländern. Gründe der Hochschulwahl
und Bewertungen der Hochschulregionen West- und Ostdeutschlands ordered by Hochschul –
Informationssystem GmbH 2008.
only 43% of roads in eastern Germany were suitable for unlimited use, and
around 17% of the railway network there was damaged. Approximately 2,000
km of main roads and a network of railroads have been reconstructed or built
in the new federal states so far, for which almost 30 billion euros has been allo-
cated. In 1991–2009, subsidies for the development and modernisation of rail-
ways in Germany as a whole reached 69 billion euros, including 29 billion euros
for the new federal states. In turn, the construction and repairs of main roads
in Germany as a whole cost around 88.3 billion euros, including 32 billion euros
in the eastern federal states. Since the area of the new federal states is much
smaller, the effects of the investments in infrastructural modernisation can be
seen much faster than in the case of western Germany. Overhauled railway sta-
tions, refurbished towns and cities and a perfectly maintained and organised
network of roads are highly prominent in the landscape of the new federal
states. Meanwhile, the infrastructure in the old federal states is still mostly
outdated and needs to be modernised. This situation, combined with the dete-
riorating condition in many western German communes as an effect of the
global financial crisis, increasingly often meets with objection from politicians
and residents in the western federal states. They claim that the financing of
renovation and the development of infrastructure should be stopped in eastern
Germany, and the funds saved as a result should be spent on the modernisation
of the western part of the country98. Such claims have been rejected by politi-
cians from the new federal states, who state that they are a manifestation of
the lack of solidarity between residents of both parts of Germany. Given the
lack of support from many politicians and the unusually tough condition of
Ger man public finances, it is likely that subsidisation as part of the solidarity
packages will not be continued although, in the opinion of some experts, the
new federal states will not be fully self-sufficient when the second solidarity
package will have expired in 2019.
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98 A statement the transport minister, Peter Ramsauer, (CSU) made in 2009, suggesting that it was
necessary to provide financial backing for the development of the A1 motorway and a ring road
around Cologne instead of subsidising the eastern federal states sparked heated debated in Germany.
Many opponents claimed the minister wanted to unleash an ‘envy dispute’ and appeal to the lowest
human instincts. However, Ramsauer’s opinion also received noticeable support from some politi-
cians representing the western federal states.
3.7. The benefits reunification has given to each part of Germany
The predominant view in public discourse is that the eastern federal states are
the only beneficiary of the subsidies financed by the federal budget and the
budgets of individual federal states, among other sources. The media present
the western federal states as unselfish contributors which support the develop -
ment of eastern Germany at the expense of their own modernisation. Beyond
all doubt, the subsidies and the funds transferred since reunification from the
federal and the local budgets have contributed to the development of the inno-
vative sectors of the economy99, which eastern Germany is a leader of: solar and
wind technology. It is especially worth noting the solar technology centres are
concentrated in Saxony, Thuringia and Saxony-Anhalt, which are also the
largest employers in the region. The research companies and institutions linked
to the solar energy industry employ approximately 10,000 people in the new
federal states and manufacture over 75% of the total quantity of solar modules
produced in Germany as a whole. Experts from the key German institutes for
economic research agree that these sectors may become the driving force of the
eastern German economy in the future. However, they note that the funds paid
as part of the second solidarity package have greatly contributed to the success
of the businesses linked to solar technologies. It is unclear whether those firms
will be able to maintain their position once the programme has expired in 2019.
The subsidising of certain economic sectors in the east of Germany has also
offered measurable advantages to western German companies. This in particu-
lar concerns the firms which benefited from the operation of the Federal Trust
Agency for Privatisation. Additionally, many western German investors (and
also foreign investors) received an investment subsidy (Investitionszulage) from
the state budget which was equal to 6% of the investment value (this was
made in the form of a tax deduction which all investors in the new federal states
were authorised to receive under the applicable laws). In the initial phase of the
transformation this covered for example the banking sector and the construc-
tion industry, while at present the subsidies apply only in heavy industry and
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99 These are companies established from the very start in the new federal states unlike companies in
most other sectors, which are simply subcontractors of their western German mother companies.
the services sector. Experts emphasise that the subsidies (including those grant-
ed as part of the solidarity packages) have been a serious reason for investors
to move their offices to or to establish new firms in the new federal states. How-
ever, most of them are simply branch offices of western German corporations
specialising in the manufacturing of components, while innovation centres are
still located in the old federal states. This is adversely affecting the opportuni-
ties of boosting economic growth in the new federal states.
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Conclusion
During the first weeks after reunification most people in Germany shared the
opinion that “now grows together what belongs together”100. The then chan-
cellor, Helmut Kohl, promised “blossoming landscapes” in the new federal states
within 3 or 4 years following reunification. The reality has turned out to be much
more complex. The process of the two Germanys growing into one has proven
much more difficult and longer, and its costs – both financial and social – have
exceeded even the most pessimistic forecasts. Germany has not managed to
achieve total unity twenty years after the reunification treaty date. Deep divides
still exist between the old and the new federal states. This primarily concerns
mindsets: Germans from both parts of the country still do not see themselves
as one nation, which is manifested through mutual stereotypes, differences in
behaviour and also in such essential areas as the understanding and interpre-
tation of the histories of the two German states until 1989 (for example, the
dispute as to whether the GDR was a lawless state). All this strengthens the
division of society, which can be seen for example within the political elite and
in the media, which are opening up to representatives of the new federal states
very slowly. The remaining differences in self-perception and the perception of
their own lives are also reflected in their dissimilar behaviours during elections
and in political preferences. Voter turnout is as a rule lower in the new federal
states than in the west of Germany. The FDP and the Green Party are less popu -
lar, whereas radical right groupings and the Left Party have more supporters in
the east of Germany. It has also proved impossible to eliminate the differences
in the economic development levels of western and eastern federal states over
the last twenty years. Nevertheless, industrial centres have already been estab-
lished in the southern new federal states (Thuringia, Saxony and Saxony-
-Anhalt) as in the southern states in the west of the country, which are the
strongest in this regard. However, funds transferred from the federal budget
and the budgets of individual federal states, as well as EU subsidies, have
caused a noticeable improvement in the condition of the economy and infra-
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100 “Jetzt muss zusammenwachsen, was zusammengehört“ – the words Willy Brandt said on 10 Novem -
ber 1989 in front of the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin.
structure in the new federal states. In some cases, there are even dispropor-
tions to the disadvantage of the old federal states, where the roads, railroads,
railway stations, etc. need to be modernised. While summing up the changes
which have taken place since the reunification of Germany, it is also impossible
not to mention the fact that western German companies have also tangibly
benefited from the subsidisation of the economy of the eastern federal states.
Two decades since the start of the reunification this process is seen much more
realistically than in 1990. Nobody expects immediate results any more. The pre-
dominant view is that the transformation will take a long time and that it is im -
possible to predict when it will end. This is accompanied by the disillusionment
of many Germans who expected spectacular effects. Paradoxically, such a change
in approach may have a positive impact on the reunification of the two socie -
ties. From the present point of view, having considered the economic and politi -
cal changes which have taken place, it is the social divides which seem to be
the greatest challenge in the context of a total reunification of Germany. The
knitting together of the two societies until they grow into one body will require
a great effort and great sensitivity especially from western Germans, since they
are the ones who ‘accept’ the new members. Many eastern Germans are embit-
tered due to the lack of appreciation of the achievements they made in many
various areas before the fall of the Berlin wall. Becoming open to fellow citizens
from the eastern federal states means admitting them to full participation in
the social and political life of the country. Therefore, this requires increasing the
presence of eastern Germans as representatives of residents of the new federal
states in the media with national coverage, the leadership of political parties,
trade unions and interest groups.
The assumption that two different countries would become one body within
two decades was wrong as such. It disregarded the fact that the sixteen federal
states, with different development levels inherent in their history, were to be
unified. The agricultural north and the more industrialised south had for a long
time differed in terms of economic development, religious beliefs and even lan-
guage. As new generations are born and migrations inside the country contin-
ues, the differences in the mindsets in eastern and western Germany, under-
stood as two separate blocs, will gradually vanish. What will remain are the re -
gional differences, which are unquestioned by anyone and are perceived as ob -
O S W  S t u d i e s
C
o
n
c
lu
s
io
n
74
vious and natural in the east and the west federal states alike. The young gene -
ration of Germans does not remember a Germany which is not united. Perhaps
when they start their adult lives, the perception of the unification of the two
German states will evolve and allow one to look at the changes taking place as
part of this process as something positive.
Marta Zawilska-Florczuk
Artur Ciechanowicz
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